Civil-Military Relations under Jokowi: Between Military Corporate Interests and Presidential Handholding

This essay examines the disposition of civil-military relations under President Joko "Jokowi" Widodo. It makes three arguments. First, since assuming office in 2014, Jokowi has tended to adopt a hands-off approach in the day-to-day management of military affairs and defense policy. He has...

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Veröffentlicht in:Asia policy 2019-10, Vol.14 (4), p.63-71
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description This essay examines the disposition of civil-military relations under President Joko "Jokowi" Widodo. It makes three arguments. First, since assuming office in 2014, Jokowi has tended to adopt a hands-off approach in the day-to-day management of military affairs and defense policy. He has relied on a group of retired generals as his intermediary with the Indonesian military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, or TNI). He also gave the TNI organizational autonomy and even encouraged its involvement in nonmilitary domains, from counterterrorism to food-sufficiency programs. Civil-military relations under Jokowi's first term were basically on autopilot. Second, Jokowi's management of the TNI is not unique. All post-Suharto presidents have had to deal with the same dilemma: how to carefully and closely manage the military without threatening its corporate interests. I develop a typology of the responses to this dilemma to classify and compare Jokowi's civil-military relations with other post-Suharto presidents: B.J. Habibie (1998-99), Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001), Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-4), and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-14). The typology shows that Jokowi's passive management of the TNI, while protecting the military's corporate interests, is similar to Sukarnoputri's approach. The typology also serves as an analytical baseline to unpack civil-military relations under Jokowi's first term. Third, civil-military relations during Jokowi's second term are unlikely to be fundamentally different from his first. As far as civil-military relations are concerned, the 2019 elections did not change the fact that Jokowi is a president without his own political party and that he needs the support of the broader security establishment-the TNI and the Indonesian National Police (POLRI)-to execute his agenda. If anything, the polarized presidential campaign against retired general Prabowo Subianto likely will push Jokowi to further rely on the TNI in governance. The first section compares how different post-Suharto presidents managed civil-military relations. The subsequent section then examines civil-military relations during Jokowi's first term. The essay concludes by looking ahead to Jokowi's second term and assessing the broader implications for Indonesia's democratic trajectory in the coming years.
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Habibie (1998-99), Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001), Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-4), and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-14). The typology shows that Jokowi's passive management of the TNI, while protecting the military's corporate interests, is similar to Sukarnoputri's approach. The typology also serves as an analytical baseline to unpack civil-military relations under Jokowi's first term. Third, civil-military relations during Jokowi's second term are unlikely to be fundamentally different from his first. As far as civil-military relations are concerned, the 2019 elections did not change the fact that Jokowi is a president without his own political party and that he needs the support of the broader security establishment-the TNI and the Indonesian National Police (POLRI)-to execute his agenda. If anything, the polarized presidential campaign against retired general Prabowo Subianto likely will push Jokowi to further rely on the TNI in governance. 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The first section compares how different post-Suharto presidents managed civil-military relations. The subsequent section then examines civil-military relations during Jokowi's first term. The essay concludes by looking ahead to Jokowi's second term and assessing the broader implications for Indonesia's democratic trajectory in the coming years.</abstract><cop>Seattle</cop><pub>National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR)</pub><doi>10.1353/asp.2019.0047</doi><tpages>9</tpages></addata></record>
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source PAIS Index; Elektronische Zeitschriftenbibliothek - Frei zugängliche E-Journals; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing; Political Science Complete
subjects Authoritarianism
Civil-military relations
Counterterrorism
Leadership
Military administration
Military base closures
Political parties
Politics
Presidents
ROUNDTABLE: Indonesia After the 2019 Election
Variables
Vice Presidents
title Civil-Military Relations under Jokowi: Between Military Corporate Interests and Presidential Handholding
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