Civil-Military Relations under Jokowi: Between Military Corporate Interests and Presidential Handholding
This essay examines the disposition of civil-military relations under President Joko "Jokowi" Widodo. It makes three arguments. First, since assuming office in 2014, Jokowi has tended to adopt a hands-off approach in the day-to-day management of military affairs and defense policy. He has...
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description | This essay examines the disposition of civil-military relations under President Joko "Jokowi" Widodo. It makes three arguments. First, since assuming office in 2014, Jokowi has tended to adopt a hands-off approach in the day-to-day management of military affairs and defense policy. He has relied on a group of retired generals as his intermediary with the Indonesian military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, or TNI). He also gave the TNI organizational autonomy and even encouraged its involvement in nonmilitary domains, from counterterrorism to food-sufficiency programs. Civil-military relations under Jokowi's first term were basically on autopilot. Second, Jokowi's management of the TNI is not unique. All post-Suharto presidents have had to deal with the same dilemma: how to carefully and closely manage the military without threatening its corporate interests. I develop a typology of the responses to this dilemma to classify and compare Jokowi's civil-military relations with other post-Suharto presidents: B.J. Habibie (1998-99), Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001), Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-4), and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-14). The typology shows that Jokowi's passive management of the TNI, while protecting the military's corporate interests, is similar to Sukarnoputri's approach. The typology also serves as an analytical baseline to unpack civil-military relations under Jokowi's first term. Third, civil-military relations during Jokowi's second term are unlikely to be fundamentally different from his first. As far as civil-military relations are concerned, the 2019 elections did not change the fact that Jokowi is a president without his own political party and that he needs the support of the broader security establishment-the TNI and the Indonesian National Police (POLRI)-to execute his agenda. If anything, the polarized presidential campaign against retired general Prabowo Subianto likely will push Jokowi to further rely on the TNI in governance. The first section compares how different post-Suharto presidents managed civil-military relations. The subsequent section then examines civil-military relations during Jokowi's first term. The essay concludes by looking ahead to Jokowi's second term and assessing the broader implications for Indonesia's democratic trajectory in the coming years. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1353/asp.2019.0047 |
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It makes three arguments. First, since assuming office in 2014, Jokowi has tended to adopt a hands-off approach in the day-to-day management of military affairs and defense policy. He has relied on a group of retired generals as his intermediary with the Indonesian military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, or TNI). He also gave the TNI organizational autonomy and even encouraged its involvement in nonmilitary domains, from counterterrorism to food-sufficiency programs. Civil-military relations under Jokowi's first term were basically on autopilot. Second, Jokowi's management of the TNI is not unique. All post-Suharto presidents have had to deal with the same dilemma: how to carefully and closely manage the military without threatening its corporate interests. I develop a typology of the responses to this dilemma to classify and compare Jokowi's civil-military relations with other post-Suharto presidents: B.J. Habibie (1998-99), Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001), Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-4), and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-14). The typology shows that Jokowi's passive management of the TNI, while protecting the military's corporate interests, is similar to Sukarnoputri's approach. The typology also serves as an analytical baseline to unpack civil-military relations under Jokowi's first term. Third, civil-military relations during Jokowi's second term are unlikely to be fundamentally different from his first. As far as civil-military relations are concerned, the 2019 elections did not change the fact that Jokowi is a president without his own political party and that he needs the support of the broader security establishment-the TNI and the Indonesian National Police (POLRI)-to execute his agenda. If anything, the polarized presidential campaign against retired general Prabowo Subianto likely will push Jokowi to further rely on the TNI in governance. The first section compares how different post-Suharto presidents managed civil-military relations. The subsequent section then examines civil-military relations during Jokowi's first term. 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It makes three arguments. First, since assuming office in 2014, Jokowi has tended to adopt a hands-off approach in the day-to-day management of military affairs and defense policy. He has relied on a group of retired generals as his intermediary with the Indonesian military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, or TNI). He also gave the TNI organizational autonomy and even encouraged its involvement in nonmilitary domains, from counterterrorism to food-sufficiency programs. Civil-military relations under Jokowi's first term were basically on autopilot. Second, Jokowi's management of the TNI is not unique. All post-Suharto presidents have had to deal with the same dilemma: how to carefully and closely manage the military without threatening its corporate interests. I develop a typology of the responses to this dilemma to classify and compare Jokowi's civil-military relations with other post-Suharto presidents: B.J. Habibie (1998-99), Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001), Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-4), and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-14). The typology shows that Jokowi's passive management of the TNI, while protecting the military's corporate interests, is similar to Sukarnoputri's approach. The typology also serves as an analytical baseline to unpack civil-military relations under Jokowi's first term. Third, civil-military relations during Jokowi's second term are unlikely to be fundamentally different from his first. As far as civil-military relations are concerned, the 2019 elections did not change the fact that Jokowi is a president without his own political party and that he needs the support of the broader security establishment-the TNI and the Indonesian National Police (POLRI)-to execute his agenda. If anything, the polarized presidential campaign against retired general Prabowo Subianto likely will push Jokowi to further rely on the TNI in governance. The first section compares how different post-Suharto presidents managed civil-military relations. The subsequent section then examines civil-military relations during Jokowi's first term. The essay concludes by looking ahead to Jokowi's second term and assessing the broader implications for Indonesia's democratic trajectory in the coming years.</description><subject>Authoritarianism</subject><subject>Civil-military relations</subject><subject>Counterterrorism</subject><subject>Leadership</subject><subject>Military administration</subject><subject>Military base closures</subject><subject>Political parties</subject><subject>Politics</subject><subject>Presidents</subject><subject>ROUNDTABLE: Indonesia After the 2019 Election</subject><subject>Variables</subject><subject>Vice 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Readers</collection><collection>PAIS Index</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>Social Science Database (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni) (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central UK/Ireland</collection><collection>Social Science Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Essentials</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>ProQuest One Community College</collection><collection>PAIS International</collection><collection>PAIS International (Ovid)</collection><collection>Politics Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Korea</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Student</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>ProQuest Politics Collection</collection><collection>Political Science Database</collection><collection>Social Science Database</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic Eastern Edition (DO NOT USE)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic UKI Edition</collection><collection>ProQuest Central China</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Basic</collection><jtitle>Asia policy</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Laksmana, Evan A.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Civil-Military Relations under Jokowi: Between Military Corporate Interests and Presidential Handholding</atitle><jtitle>Asia policy</jtitle><date>2019-10-01</date><risdate>2019</risdate><volume>14</volume><issue>4</issue><spage>63</spage><epage>71</epage><pages>63-71</pages><issn>1559-0968</issn><eissn>1559-2960</eissn><abstract>This essay examines the disposition of civil-military relations under President Joko "Jokowi" Widodo. It makes three arguments. First, since assuming office in 2014, Jokowi has tended to adopt a hands-off approach in the day-to-day management of military affairs and defense policy. He has relied on a group of retired generals as his intermediary with the Indonesian military (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, or TNI). He also gave the TNI organizational autonomy and even encouraged its involvement in nonmilitary domains, from counterterrorism to food-sufficiency programs. Civil-military relations under Jokowi's first term were basically on autopilot. Second, Jokowi's management of the TNI is not unique. All post-Suharto presidents have had to deal with the same dilemma: how to carefully and closely manage the military without threatening its corporate interests. I develop a typology of the responses to this dilemma to classify and compare Jokowi's civil-military relations with other post-Suharto presidents: B.J. Habibie (1998-99), Abdurrahman Wahid (1999-2001), Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-4), and Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (2004-14). The typology shows that Jokowi's passive management of the TNI, while protecting the military's corporate interests, is similar to Sukarnoputri's approach. The typology also serves as an analytical baseline to unpack civil-military relations under Jokowi's first term. Third, civil-military relations during Jokowi's second term are unlikely to be fundamentally different from his first. As far as civil-military relations are concerned, the 2019 elections did not change the fact that Jokowi is a president without his own political party and that he needs the support of the broader security establishment-the TNI and the Indonesian National Police (POLRI)-to execute his agenda. If anything, the polarized presidential campaign against retired general Prabowo Subianto likely will push Jokowi to further rely on the TNI in governance. The first section compares how different post-Suharto presidents managed civil-military relations. The subsequent section then examines civil-military relations during Jokowi's first term. The essay concludes by looking ahead to Jokowi's second term and assessing the broader implications for Indonesia's democratic trajectory in the coming years.</abstract><cop>Seattle</cop><pub>National Bureau of Asian Research (NBR)</pub><doi>10.1353/asp.2019.0047</doi><tpages>9</tpages></addata></record> |
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source | PAIS Index; Elektronische Zeitschriftenbibliothek - Frei zugängliche E-Journals; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing; Political Science Complete |
subjects | Authoritarianism Civil-military relations Counterterrorism Leadership Military administration Military base closures Political parties Politics Presidents ROUNDTABLE: Indonesia After the 2019 Election Variables Vice Presidents |
title | Civil-Military Relations under Jokowi: Between Military Corporate Interests and Presidential Handholding |
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