Schellenberg on the epistemic force of experience

According to Schellenberg, our perceptual experiences have the epistemic force they to because they are exercises of certain sorts of capacity, namely capacities to discriminate particulars—objects, property-instances and events—in a sensory mode. She calls her account the "capacity view."...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:

Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:	Philosophical studies 2016-04, Vol.173 (4), p.897-905
1. Verfasser:	McGrath, Matthew
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Belief Belief & doubt Education Empirical evidence Epistemic justification Epistemology Ethics Evidence Externalism Intuition Justified beliefs Metaphysics Perceptions Perceptual experiences Philosophy Philosophy of Language Philosophy of Mind Truth
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
Tags:	Tag hinzufügen Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!

Schreiben Sie den ersten Kommentar!