Coalitional extreme desirability in finitely additive economies with asymmetric information
We prove a coalitional core-Walras equivalence theorem for an asymmetric information exchange economy with a finitely additive measure space of agents, finitely many states of nature, and an infinite dimensional commodity space having the Radon–Nikodym property and whose positive cone has possibly e...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of mathematical economics 2019-10, Vol.84, p.83-93 |
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| container_title | Journal of mathematical economics |
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| creator | Bhowmik, Anuj Centrone, Francesca Martellotti, Anna |
| description | We prove a coalitional core-Walras equivalence theorem for an asymmetric information exchange economy with a finitely additive measure space of agents, finitely many states of nature, and an infinite dimensional commodity space having the Radon–Nikodym property and whose positive cone has possibly empty interior. The result is based on a new cone condition, firstly developed in Centrone and Martellotti (2015), called coalitional extreme desirability. We also formulate a notion of incentive compatibility suitable for coalitional models and study it in relation to equilibria. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.jmateco.2019.07.003 |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | Journal of mathematical economics, 2019-10, Vol.84, p.83-93 |
| issn | 0304-4068 1873-1538 |
| language | eng |
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| source | ScienceDirect Journals (5 years ago - present) |
| subjects | Additives Asymmetric information Asymmetry Coalitional economies Commodities Core-Walras equivalence Economic models Finitely additive measure Information sharing Private core Property Radon Reagents Theorems Walrasian expectation equilibria |
| title | Coalitional extreme desirability in finitely additive economies with asymmetric information |
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