Moral Encroachment
Abstract This paper develops a precise understanding of the thesis of moral encroachment, which states that the epistemic status of an opinion can depend on its moral features. In addition, I raise objections to existing accounts of moral encroachment. For instance, many accounts fail to give suffic...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 2018-07, Vol.118 (2), p.177-205 |
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| container_title | Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society |
| container_volume | 118 |
| creator | Moss, Sarah |
| description | Abstract
This paper develops a precise understanding of the thesis of moral encroachment, which states that the epistemic status of an opinion can depend on its moral features. In addition, I raise objections to existing accounts of moral encroachment. For instance, many accounts fail to give sufficient attention to moral encroachment on credences. Also, many accounts focus on moral features that fail to support standard analogies between pragmatic and moral encroachment. Throughout the paper, I discuss racial profiling as a case study, arguing that moral encroachment can help us identify one respect in which racial profiling is epistemically problematic. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1093/arisoc/aoy007 |
| format | Article |
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This paper develops a precise understanding of the thesis of moral encroachment, which states that the epistemic status of an opinion can depend on its moral features. In addition, I raise objections to existing accounts of moral encroachment. For instance, many accounts fail to give sufficient attention to moral encroachment on credences. Also, many accounts focus on moral features that fail to support standard analogies between pragmatic and moral encroachment. Throughout the paper, I discuss racial profiling as a case study, arguing that moral encroachment can help us identify one respect in which racial profiling is epistemically problematic.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0066-7374</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1467-9264</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1093/arisoc/aoy007</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Oxford: Oxford University Press</publisher><subject>Epistemology ; Morality ; Racial profiling</subject><ispartof>Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2018-07, Vol.118 (2), p.177-205</ispartof><rights>2018 The Aristotelian Society 2018</rights><rights>2018 The Aristotelian Society</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c2527-d0ea9b6e8f6c41ba15f98cb83d0b1def8e40527cf7699098b134c624b166d59b3</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c2527-d0ea9b6e8f6c41ba15f98cb83d0b1def8e40527cf7699098b134c624b166d59b3</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,1578,27903,27904</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Moss, Sarah</creatorcontrib><title>Moral Encroachment</title><title>Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society</title><description>Abstract
This paper develops a precise understanding of the thesis of moral encroachment, which states that the epistemic status of an opinion can depend on its moral features. In addition, I raise objections to existing accounts of moral encroachment. For instance, many accounts fail to give sufficient attention to moral encroachment on credences. Also, many accounts focus on moral features that fail to support standard analogies between pragmatic and moral encroachment. Throughout the paper, I discuss racial profiling as a case study, arguing that moral encroachment can help us identify one respect in which racial profiling is epistemically problematic.</description><subject>Epistemology</subject><subject>Morality</subject><subject>Racial profiling</subject><issn>0066-7374</issn><issn>1467-9264</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2018</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>8G5</sourceid><sourceid>ABUWG</sourceid><sourceid>AFKRA</sourceid><sourceid>AZQEC</sourceid><sourceid>BENPR</sourceid><sourceid>CCPQU</sourceid><sourceid>DWQXO</sourceid><sourceid>GNUQQ</sourceid><sourceid>GUQSH</sourceid><sourceid>M2O</sourceid><recordid>eNqFzz1PwzAQBmALgUQoLEjsSCwsoefYPtsjqsqHVMQCs2U7tmjV1sFuhv57jMLOLbc8eu9eQm4oPFDQbG7zuiQ_t-kIIE9IQznKVnfIT0kDgNhKJvk5uShlA3VQ8YZcv6Vst7fLvc_J-q9d2B8uyVm02xKu_vaMfD4tPxYv7er9-XXxuGp9JzrZ9hCsdhhURM-ps1RErbxTrAdH-xBV4FCdjxK1Bq0cZdxjxx1F7IV2bEbuptwhp-8xlIPZpDHv60nTMWBKCIG0qnZS9cFScohmyOudzUdDwfzWNlNtM9Wu_n7yaRz-oT-8lliw</recordid><startdate>20180701</startdate><enddate>20180701</enddate><creator>Moss, Sarah</creator><general>Oxford University Press</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>3V.</scope><scope>7XB</scope><scope>8FK</scope><scope>8G5</scope><scope>AABKS</scope><scope>ABSDQ</scope><scope>ABUWG</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>AZQEC</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>GNUQQ</scope><scope>GUQSH</scope><scope>M2O</scope><scope>MBDVC</scope><scope>PADUT</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>PRINS</scope><scope>Q9U</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20180701</creationdate><title>Moral Encroachment</title><author>Moss, Sarah</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c2527-d0ea9b6e8f6c41ba15f98cb83d0b1def8e40527cf7699098b134c624b166d59b3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2018</creationdate><topic>Epistemology</topic><topic>Morality</topic><topic>Racial profiling</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Moss, Sarah</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Corporate)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni) (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>Research Library (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>Philosophy Collection</collection><collection>Philosophy Database</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central UK/Ireland</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Essentials</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>ProQuest One Community College</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Korea</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Student</collection><collection>Research Library Prep</collection><collection>Research Library</collection><collection>Research Library (Corporate)</collection><collection>Research Library China</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic Eastern Edition (DO NOT USE)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic UKI Edition</collection><collection>ProQuest Central China</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Basic</collection><jtitle>Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Moss, Sarah</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Moral Encroachment</atitle><jtitle>Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society</jtitle><date>2018-07-01</date><risdate>2018</risdate><volume>118</volume><issue>2</issue><spage>177</spage><epage>205</epage><pages>177-205</pages><issn>0066-7374</issn><eissn>1467-9264</eissn><abstract>Abstract
This paper develops a precise understanding of the thesis of moral encroachment, which states that the epistemic status of an opinion can depend on its moral features. In addition, I raise objections to existing accounts of moral encroachment. For instance, many accounts fail to give sufficient attention to moral encroachment on credences. Also, many accounts focus on moral features that fail to support standard analogies between pragmatic and moral encroachment. Throughout the paper, I discuss racial profiling as a case study, arguing that moral encroachment can help us identify one respect in which racial profiling is epistemically problematic.</abstract><cop>Oxford</cop><pub>Oxford University Press</pub><doi>10.1093/arisoc/aoy007</doi><tpages>29</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0066-7374 |
| ispartof | Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 2018-07, Vol.118 (2), p.177-205 |
| issn | 0066-7374 1467-9264 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_journals_2303855561 |
| source | Jstor Complete Legacy; Oxford University Press Journals All Titles (1996-Current) |
| subjects | Epistemology Morality Racial profiling |
| title | Moral Encroachment |
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