No Reasons to Believe the False

No Reasons to Believe the False

I argue that if there are nondisabled reasons to believe p, then there cannot be nondisabled reasons to believe something incompatible with p. I first defend a restricted version of the view, which applies only to situations where the relevant agent has complete evidence. Then, I argue for a general...

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Veröffentlicht in:Pacific philosophical quarterly 2019-09, Vol.100 (3), p.703-722
1. Verfasser: Prado, Javier González
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Belief & doubt
Credibility
Evidence
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creator Prado, Javier González
description I argue that if there are nondisabled reasons to believe p, then there cannot be nondisabled reasons to believe something incompatible with p. I first defend a restricted version of the view, which applies only to situations where the relevant agent has complete evidence. Then, I argue for a generalized version of the view, which holds regardless of the agent's evidence. As a related result, I show that, given plausible assumptions, there cannot be nondisabled reasons to believe something false.
doi_str_mv 10.1111/papq.12271
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ispartof Pacific philosophical quarterly, 2019-09, Vol.100 (3), p.703-722
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source Wiley Online Library Journals Frontfile Complete
subjects Belief & doubt
Credibility
Evidence
title No Reasons to Believe the False
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