REASONS, CAUSES, AND CONTRASTS
: The standard argument for the causal theory of action is “Davidson's Challenge”: explain the connection between reasons and actions without appealing to the idea that reasons cause actions. I argue that this is an argument to the best contrastive explanation. After examining the nature of co...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Pacific philosophical quarterly 2007-03, Vol.88 (1), p.1-23 |
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description | : The standard argument for the causal theory of action is “Davidson's Challenge”: explain the connection between reasons and actions without appealing to the idea that reasons cause actions. I argue that this is an argument to the best contrastive explanation. After examining the nature of contrastive explanation in detail, I show that the causalist does not yet have the best explanation. The best explanation would appeal further to the motivational strength of reasons. Finally, I show how this undermines the argument for causalism, since noncausalists, too, can meet Davidson's Challenge by appealing to motivational strength to explain the cases at issue. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1111/j.1468-0114.2007.00278.x |
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I argue that this is an argument to the best contrastive explanation. After examining the nature of contrastive explanation in detail, I show that the causalist does not yet have the best explanation. The best explanation would appeal further to the motivational strength of reasons. Finally, I show how this undermines the argument for causalism, since noncausalists, too, can meet Davidson's Challenge by appealing to motivational strength to explain the cases at issue.</abstract><cop>Oxford, UK</cop><pub>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</pub><doi>10.1111/j.1468-0114.2007.00278.x</doi><tpages>23</tpages></addata></record> |
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title | REASONS, CAUSES, AND CONTRASTS |
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