Elusive Objects

Do we directly perceive physical objects? What is the significance of the qualification ‘directly’ here? Austin famously denied that there was a unique interpretation by which we could make sense of the traditional debate in the philosophy of perception. I look here at Thompson Clarke’s discussion o...

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Veröffentlicht in:Topoi 2017-06, Vol.36 (2), p.247-271
1. Verfasser: Martin, M. G. F.
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description Do we directly perceive physical objects? What is the significance of the qualification ‘directly’ here? Austin famously denied that there was a unique interpretation by which we could make sense of the traditional debate in the philosophy of perception. I look here at Thompson Clarke’s discussion of G. E. Moore and surface perception to answer Austin’s scepticism.
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subjects Debates
Education
Philosophy
Philosophy of Science
Philosophy of Technology
Realism
title Elusive Objects
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