One-way monotonicity as a form of strategy-proofness

Suppose that a vote consists of a linear ranking of alternatives, and that in a certain profile some single pivotal voter v is able to change the outcome of an election from s alone to t alone, by changing her vote from P v to . A voting rule is two-way monotonic if such an effect is only possible w...

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Veröffentlicht in:	International journal of game theory 2009-11, Vol.38 (4), p.553-574
Hauptverfasser:	Sanver, M. Remzi, Zwicker, William S.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Behavioral/Experimental Economics Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economics Economics and Finance Game Theory Mathematical functions Mathematical models Operations Research/Decision Theory Preferences Social and Behav. Sciences Studies Voter behavior Voters
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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