Moral Being in Contemporary Views of the Self

Moral Being in Contemporary Views of the Self

Recent discussions of the nature of mind, emotion, and self have often intersected with renewed interest in the sources of morals and morality. In this article I examine proposals on these matters by Charles Taylor and two of his interlocutors, Thomas Wren and Justin Oakley. I describe and compare t...

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Veröffentlicht in:Dialogue - Canadian Philosophical Association 2006, Vol.45 (4), p.713-729
1. Verfasser: Vance, Robert L.
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Epistemology
Identity
Morality
Ontology
Philosophy
Theory of values and moral philosophy
Theory of values and moral philosophy. Philosophy of action
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description Recent discussions of the nature of mind, emotion, and self have often intersected with renewed interest in the sources of morals and morality. In this article I examine proposals on these matters by Charles Taylor and two of his interlocutors, Thomas Wren and Justin Oakley. I describe and compare the “holistic” epistemological approaches of these three in their searches for the “moral self,” and then evaluate the adequacy of their correlative ontological proposals. Finally, I discuss the meta-ethical implications of these emotive views of selfhood in terms of the objective or subjective status of moral values to determine whether these views meet the philosophers' own criteria for moral plausibility.
doi_str_mv 10.1017/S0012217300001256
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source Cambridge Journals Online
subjects Epistemology
Identity
Morality
Ontology
Philosophy
Theory of values and moral philosophy
Theory of values and moral philosophy. Philosophy of action
title Moral Being in Contemporary Views of the Self
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