Institutional investor cliques and governance
We examine the impact of investor coordination on governance. We identify coordinating groups of investors (cliques) as those connected through the network of institutional holdings. Clique members vote together on proxy items: a one standard deviation increase in clique ownership more than doubles...
Gespeichert in:
| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of financial economics 2019-07, Vol.133 (1), p.175-197 |
|---|---|
| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| container_end_page | 197 |
|---|---|
| container_issue | 1 |
| container_start_page | 175 |
| container_title | Journal of financial economics |
| container_volume | 133 |
| creator | Crane, Alan D. Koch, Andrew Michenaud, Sébastien |
| description | We examine the impact of investor coordination on governance. We identify coordinating groups of investors (cliques) as those connected through the network of institutional holdings. Clique members vote together on proxy items: a one standard deviation increase in clique ownership more than doubles votes against low quality management proposals. We use the 2003 mutual fund trading scandal to show that this effect is causal. These findings suggest coordination strengthens governance via voice. Coordination, however, also weakens governance via threat of exit. Clique owners exit positions more slowly, and firm value responds negatively to liquidity shocks when clique ownership is high. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.11.012 |
| format | Article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>proquest_cross</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_journals_2244147005</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><els_id>S0304405X18303210</els_id><sourcerecordid>2244147005</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c402t-c2423a1d374e25aab1ef9ff3adb7f94d586dceed738c16615d005d46d8e77123</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNqFkEFLAzEUhIMoWKs_QVjwvGteNtnsnkSK1kLBSw_eQpq8lSxrUpO04L93a3v3Xd5lZpj5CLkHWgGF5nGoht55NKFiFNoKoKLALsgMWtmVTEp-SWa0przkVHxck5uUBjqdFN2MlCufssv77ILXY-H8AVMOsTCj-95jKrS3xWc4YPTaG7wlV70eE96d_5xsXl82i7dy_b5cLZ7XpeGU5dIwzmoNtpYcmdB6C9h3fV9ru5V9x61oG2sQraxbA00DwlIqLG9si1ICq-fk4RS7i-HYIqsh7KcGY1KMcQ5cTvpJJU4qE0NKEXu1i-5Lxx8FVB3BqEGdwagjGAWg6F_608mH04KDw6iScTitsy6iycoG90_CL_IVbqA</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>2244147005</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Institutional investor cliques and governance</title><source>Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals</source><creator>Crane, Alan D. ; Koch, Andrew ; Michenaud, Sébastien</creator><creatorcontrib>Crane, Alan D. ; Koch, Andrew ; Michenaud, Sébastien</creatorcontrib><description>We examine the impact of investor coordination on governance. We identify coordinating groups of investors (cliques) as those connected through the network of institutional holdings. Clique members vote together on proxy items: a one standard deviation increase in clique ownership more than doubles votes against low quality management proposals. We use the 2003 mutual fund trading scandal to show that this effect is causal. These findings suggest coordination strengthens governance via voice. Coordination, however, also weakens governance via threat of exit. Clique owners exit positions more slowly, and firm value responds negatively to liquidity shocks when clique ownership is high.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0304-405X</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1879-2774</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.11.012</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Amsterdam: Elsevier B.V</publisher><subject>Cliques ; Coordination ; Deviation ; Exit ; Governance ; Institutional investments ; Institutional ownership ; Investment ; Investors ; Mutual funds ; Owners ; Ownership ; Quality management ; Scandals ; Stock options ; Trading ; Voice</subject><ispartof>Journal of financial economics, 2019-07, Vol.133 (1), p.175-197</ispartof><rights>2018</rights><rights>Copyright Elsevier Sequoia S.A. Jul 2019</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c402t-c2423a1d374e25aab1ef9ff3adb7f94d586dceed738c16615d005d46d8e77123</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c402t-c2423a1d374e25aab1ef9ff3adb7f94d586dceed738c16615d005d46d8e77123</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0304405X18303210$$EHTML$$P50$$Gelsevier$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,3537,27903,27904,65309</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Crane, Alan D.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Koch, Andrew</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Michenaud, Sébastien</creatorcontrib><title>Institutional investor cliques and governance</title><title>Journal of financial economics</title><description>We examine the impact of investor coordination on governance. We identify coordinating groups of investors (cliques) as those connected through the network of institutional holdings. Clique members vote together on proxy items: a one standard deviation increase in clique ownership more than doubles votes against low quality management proposals. We use the 2003 mutual fund trading scandal to show that this effect is causal. These findings suggest coordination strengthens governance via voice. Coordination, however, also weakens governance via threat of exit. Clique owners exit positions more slowly, and firm value responds negatively to liquidity shocks when clique ownership is high.</description><subject>Cliques</subject><subject>Coordination</subject><subject>Deviation</subject><subject>Exit</subject><subject>Governance</subject><subject>Institutional investments</subject><subject>Institutional ownership</subject><subject>Investment</subject><subject>Investors</subject><subject>Mutual funds</subject><subject>Owners</subject><subject>Ownership</subject><subject>Quality management</subject><subject>Scandals</subject><subject>Stock options</subject><subject>Trading</subject><subject>Voice</subject><issn>0304-405X</issn><issn>1879-2774</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2019</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNqFkEFLAzEUhIMoWKs_QVjwvGteNtnsnkSK1kLBSw_eQpq8lSxrUpO04L93a3v3Xd5lZpj5CLkHWgGF5nGoht55NKFiFNoKoKLALsgMWtmVTEp-SWa0przkVHxck5uUBjqdFN2MlCufssv77ILXY-H8AVMOsTCj-95jKrS3xWc4YPTaG7wlV70eE96d_5xsXl82i7dy_b5cLZ7XpeGU5dIwzmoNtpYcmdB6C9h3fV9ru5V9x61oG2sQraxbA00DwlIqLG9si1ICq-fk4RS7i-HYIqsh7KcGY1KMcQ5cTvpJJU4qE0NKEXu1i-5Lxx8FVB3BqEGdwagjGAWg6F_608mH04KDw6iScTitsy6iycoG90_CL_IVbqA</recordid><startdate>20190701</startdate><enddate>20190701</enddate><creator>Crane, Alan D.</creator><creator>Koch, Andrew</creator><creator>Michenaud, Sébastien</creator><general>Elsevier B.V</general><general>Elsevier Sequoia S.A</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20190701</creationdate><title>Institutional investor cliques and governance</title><author>Crane, Alan D. ; Koch, Andrew ; Michenaud, Sébastien</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c402t-c2423a1d374e25aab1ef9ff3adb7f94d586dceed738c16615d005d46d8e77123</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2019</creationdate><topic>Cliques</topic><topic>Coordination</topic><topic>Deviation</topic><topic>Exit</topic><topic>Governance</topic><topic>Institutional investments</topic><topic>Institutional ownership</topic><topic>Investment</topic><topic>Investors</topic><topic>Mutual funds</topic><topic>Owners</topic><topic>Ownership</topic><topic>Quality management</topic><topic>Scandals</topic><topic>Stock options</topic><topic>Trading</topic><topic>Voice</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Crane, Alan D.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Koch, Andrew</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Michenaud, Sébastien</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>Journal of financial economics</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Crane, Alan D.</au><au>Koch, Andrew</au><au>Michenaud, Sébastien</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Institutional investor cliques and governance</atitle><jtitle>Journal of financial economics</jtitle><date>2019-07-01</date><risdate>2019</risdate><volume>133</volume><issue>1</issue><spage>175</spage><epage>197</epage><pages>175-197</pages><issn>0304-405X</issn><eissn>1879-2774</eissn><abstract>We examine the impact of investor coordination on governance. We identify coordinating groups of investors (cliques) as those connected through the network of institutional holdings. Clique members vote together on proxy items: a one standard deviation increase in clique ownership more than doubles votes against low quality management proposals. We use the 2003 mutual fund trading scandal to show that this effect is causal. These findings suggest coordination strengthens governance via voice. Coordination, however, also weakens governance via threat of exit. Clique owners exit positions more slowly, and firm value responds negatively to liquidity shocks when clique ownership is high.</abstract><cop>Amsterdam</cop><pub>Elsevier B.V</pub><doi>10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.11.012</doi><tpages>23</tpages></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0304-405X |
| ispartof | Journal of financial economics, 2019-07, Vol.133 (1), p.175-197 |
| issn | 0304-405X 1879-2774 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_journals_2244147005 |
| source | Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals |
| subjects | Cliques Coordination Deviation Exit Governance Institutional investments Institutional ownership Investment Investors Mutual funds Owners Ownership Quality management Scandals Stock options Trading Voice |
| title | Institutional investor cliques and governance |
| url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-28T02%3A23%3A03IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_cross&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Institutional%20investor%20cliques%20and%20governance&rft.jtitle=Journal%20of%20financial%20economics&rft.au=Crane,%20Alan%20D.&rft.date=2019-07-01&rft.volume=133&rft.issue=1&rft.spage=175&rft.epage=197&rft.pages=175-197&rft.issn=0304-405X&rft.eissn=1879-2774&rft_id=info:doi/10.1016/j.jfineco.2018.11.012&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_cross%3E2244147005%3C/proquest_cross%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=2244147005&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_els_id=S0304405X18303210&rfr_iscdi=true |