Dominance of contributions monitoring in teams

In team problems it has been previously argued that there is no loss to the principal from monitoring team output compared to monitoring of individual contributions, a result known as monitoring equivalence. Optimal output monitoring, however, sometimes required up front payment from the agents to t...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Social choice and welfare 2019-10, Vol.53 (3), p.467-495
Hauptverfasser:	Bag, Parimal K., Wang, Peng
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Dominance Economic models Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economics Economics and Finance Game Theory International Political Economy Liability Limited liability Moral hazard Original Paper Public Finance Social and Behav. Sciences Social Policy Teams
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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