Dominance of contributions monitoring in teams
In team problems it has been previously argued that there is no loss to the principal from monitoring team output compared to monitoring of individual contributions, a result known as monitoring equivalence. Optimal output monitoring, however, sometimes required up front payment from the agents to t...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Social choice and welfare 2019-10, Vol.53 (3), p.467-495 |
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| creator | Bag, Parimal K. Wang, Peng |
| description | In team problems it has been previously argued that there is no loss to the principal from monitoring team output compared to monitoring of individual contributions, a result known as monitoring equivalence. Optimal output monitoring, however, sometimes required up front payment from the agents to the principal. By introducing limited liability (LL) on the part of agents that rules out positive monetary transfers to the principal, it is shown that the principal strictly benefits by monitoring individual contributions. Positive rent of the lowest type under output monitoring with LL implies there will be a dominating contributions monitoring contract that further transfers some of this rent to the principal. Thus, unlimited agent liability is necessary for the equivalence result. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s00355-019-01193-7 |
| format | Article |
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| source | Jstor Complete Legacy; EBSCOhost Political Science Complete; SpringerLink Journals; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; EBSCOhost Business Source Complete |
| subjects | Dominance Economic models Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economics Economics and Finance Game Theory International Political Economy Liability Limited liability Moral hazard Original Paper Public Finance Social and Behav. Sciences Social Policy Teams |
| title | Dominance of contributions monitoring in teams |
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