QUANTIFYING BURDENS OF PROOF: A LIKELIHOOD RATIO APPROACH

In previous studies, burden of proof has been quantified using estimates of probabilities associated with the forensic standard "beyond a reasonable doubt." It is argued here that quantification of burden of proof requires consideration of prior opinion and that the relationship between pr...

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Veröffentlicht in:Jurimetrics (Chicago, Ill.) Ill.), 1987-07, Vol.27 (4), p.383-402
Hauptverfasser: Martin, Anne W., Schum, David A.
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container_title Jurimetrics (Chicago, Ill.)
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Schum, David A.
description In previous studies, burden of proof has been quantified using estimates of probabilities associated with the forensic standard "beyond a reasonable doubt." It is argued here that quantification of burden of proof requires consideration of prior opinion and that the relationship between prior opinion and posterior opinion associated with the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard defines an inferred measure of the strength of evidence necessary to arrive at this standard. The methods used in this study differ from those used in other attempts to quantify these standards. Individuals were asked to indicate on an odds scale their prior opinion about the innocence of defendant and the odds value corresponding to an opinion about defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The distance between these two estimates defines an inferred likelihood ratio measure of the strength of evidence required to convict beyond a reasonable doubt, and thus represents an inferred measure of burden of proof. Statistical issues in the analysis and reporting of odds estimates are also discussed.
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identifier ISSN: 0897-1277
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2154-4344
language eng
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source HeinOnline Law Journal Library; Periodicals Index Online; Jstor Complete Legacy
subjects Beyond a reasonable doubt
Burden of proof
Defendants
Empirical evidence
Geometric mean
Guilty verdicts
Jurors
Presumption of innocence
Probative value
Statistical median
title QUANTIFYING BURDENS OF PROOF: A LIKELIHOOD RATIO APPROACH
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