QUANTIFYING BURDENS OF PROOF: A LIKELIHOOD RATIO APPROACH
In previous studies, burden of proof has been quantified using estimates of probabilities associated with the forensic standard "beyond a reasonable doubt." It is argued here that quantification of burden of proof requires consideration of prior opinion and that the relationship between pr...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Jurimetrics (Chicago, Ill.) Ill.), 1987-07, Vol.27 (4), p.383-402 |
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description | In previous studies, burden of proof has been quantified using estimates of probabilities associated with the forensic standard "beyond a reasonable doubt." It is argued here that quantification of burden of proof requires consideration of prior opinion and that the relationship between prior opinion and posterior opinion associated with the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard defines an inferred measure of the strength of evidence necessary to arrive at this standard. The methods used in this study differ from those used in other attempts to quantify these standards. Individuals were asked to indicate on an odds scale their prior opinion about the innocence of defendant and the odds value corresponding to an opinion about defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The distance between these two estimates defines an inferred likelihood ratio measure of the strength of evidence required to convict beyond a reasonable doubt, and thus represents an inferred measure of burden of proof. Statistical issues in the analysis and reporting of odds estimates are also discussed. |
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It is argued here that quantification of burden of proof requires consideration of prior opinion and that the relationship between prior opinion and posterior opinion associated with the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard defines an inferred measure of the strength of evidence necessary to arrive at this standard. The methods used in this study differ from those used in other attempts to quantify these standards. Individuals were asked to indicate on an odds scale their prior opinion about the innocence of defendant and the odds value corresponding to an opinion about defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The distance between these two estimates defines an inferred likelihood ratio measure of the strength of evidence required to convict beyond a reasonable doubt, and thus represents an inferred measure of burden of proof. 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It is argued here that quantification of burden of proof requires consideration of prior opinion and that the relationship between prior opinion and posterior opinion associated with the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard defines an inferred measure of the strength of evidence necessary to arrive at this standard. The methods used in this study differ from those used in other attempts to quantify these standards. Individuals were asked to indicate on an odds scale their prior opinion about the innocence of defendant and the odds value corresponding to an opinion about defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The distance between these two estimates defines an inferred likelihood ratio measure of the strength of evidence required to convict beyond a reasonable doubt, and thus represents an inferred measure of burden of proof. Statistical issues in the analysis and reporting of odds estimates are also discussed.</description><subject>Beyond a reasonable doubt</subject><subject>Burden of proof</subject><subject>Defendants</subject><subject>Empirical evidence</subject><subject>Geometric mean</subject><subject>Guilty verdicts</subject><subject>Jurors</subject><subject>Presumption of innocence</subject><subject>Probative value</subject><subject>Statistical median</subject><issn>0897-1277</issn><issn>2154-4344</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>1987</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>K30</sourceid><recordid>eNp1zcFPgzAYBfDGaCJO_wSTRs8kpf3K13qrDAaR0Ins4IlAxxKJyoTt4H8vZl49vcP75b0z4vFAgg8C4Jx4TGn0A454Sa6mqWeMq1CCR_TzxhRVlrxmxYo-bsplXLxQm9B1aW3yQA3Ns6c4z1Jrl7Q0VWapWc-didJrcrFr3qfu5i8XpEriKkr93K6yyOR-j4h-E7YuEAzarYT5U4UdOikk4041EkMQAtU2DFrQ4EBqdDt0bce1ZlrztuFiQe5Os_tx-Dp206Huh-P4OT_WnAvOEBXO6P4_FHCNoQLJYFa3J9VPh2Gs9-PbRzN-17-AMwHiB2OmUWw</recordid><startdate>19870701</startdate><enddate>19870701</enddate><creator>Martin, Anne W.</creator><creator>Schum, David A.</creator><general>American Bar Association</general><general>Section of Science & Technology, American Bar Association</general><scope>K30</scope><scope>PAAUG</scope><scope>PAWHS</scope><scope>PAWZZ</scope><scope>PAXOH</scope><scope>PBHAV</scope><scope>PBQSW</scope><scope>PBYQZ</scope><scope>PCIWU</scope><scope>PCMID</scope><scope>PCZJX</scope><scope>PDGRG</scope><scope>PDWWI</scope><scope>PETMR</scope><scope>PFVGT</scope><scope>PGXDX</scope><scope>PIHIL</scope><scope>PISVA</scope><scope>PJCTQ</scope><scope>PJTMS</scope><scope>PLCHJ</scope><scope>PMHAD</scope><scope>PNQDJ</scope><scope>POUND</scope><scope>PPLAD</scope><scope>PQAPC</scope><scope>PQCAN</scope><scope>PQCMW</scope><scope>PQEME</scope><scope>PQHKH</scope><scope>PQMID</scope><scope>PQNCT</scope><scope>PQNET</scope><scope>PQSCT</scope><scope>PQSET</scope><scope>PSVJG</scope><scope>PVMQY</scope><scope>PZGFC</scope><scope>SAAPM</scope><scope>K7.</scope></search><sort><creationdate>19870701</creationdate><title>QUANTIFYING BURDENS OF PROOF: A LIKELIHOOD RATIO APPROACH</title><author>Martin, Anne W. ; Schum, David A.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-j777-a6bc1304bd5402886e7c53502c8a57643378d61b494c4597cf7cbe2990992ba23</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>1987</creationdate><topic>Beyond a reasonable doubt</topic><topic>Burden of proof</topic><topic>Defendants</topic><topic>Empirical evidence</topic><topic>Geometric mean</topic><topic>Guilty verdicts</topic><topic>Jurors</topic><topic>Presumption of innocence</topic><topic>Probative value</topic><topic>Statistical median</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Martin, Anne W.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Schum, David A.</creatorcontrib><collection>Periodicals Index Online</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - West</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access (Plan D) - International</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access & Build (Plan A) - MEA</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - Midwest</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - Northeast</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access (Plan D) - Southeast</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access (Plan D) - North Central</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - Southeast</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access (Plan D) - South Central</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access & Build (Plan A) - UK / I</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access (Plan D) - Canada</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access (Plan D) - EMEALA</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - North Central</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - South Central</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access & Build (Plan A) - International</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - International</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access (Plan D) - West</collection><collection>Periodicals Index Online Segments 1-50</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access (Plan D) - APAC</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access (Plan D) - Midwest</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access (Plan D) - MEA</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - Canada</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - UK / I</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - EMEALA</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access & Build (Plan A) - APAC</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access & Build (Plan A) - Canada</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access & Build (Plan A) - West</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access & Build (Plan A) - EMEALA</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access (Plan D) - Northeast</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access & Build (Plan A) - Midwest</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access & Build (Plan A) - North Central</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access & Build (Plan A) - Northeast</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access & Build (Plan A) - South Central</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access & Build (Plan A) - Southeast</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access (Plan D) - UK / I</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - APAC</collection><collection>Primary Sources Access—Foundation Edition (Plan E) - MEA</collection><collection>Periodicals Index Online Segment 42</collection><collection>ProQuest Criminal Justice (Alumni)</collection><jtitle>Jurimetrics (Chicago, Ill.)</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Martin, Anne W.</au><au>Schum, David A.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>QUANTIFYING BURDENS OF PROOF: A LIKELIHOOD RATIO APPROACH</atitle><jtitle>Jurimetrics (Chicago, Ill.)</jtitle><date>1987-07-01</date><risdate>1987</risdate><volume>27</volume><issue>4</issue><spage>383</spage><epage>402</epage><pages>383-402</pages><issn>0897-1277</issn><eissn>2154-4344</eissn><coden>JURIFF</coden><abstract>In previous studies, burden of proof has been quantified using estimates of probabilities associated with the forensic standard "beyond a reasonable doubt." It is argued here that quantification of burden of proof requires consideration of prior opinion and that the relationship between prior opinion and posterior opinion associated with the "beyond a reasonable doubt" standard defines an inferred measure of the strength of evidence necessary to arrive at this standard. The methods used in this study differ from those used in other attempts to quantify these standards. Individuals were asked to indicate on an odds scale their prior opinion about the innocence of defendant and the odds value corresponding to an opinion about defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The distance between these two estimates defines an inferred likelihood ratio measure of the strength of evidence required to convict beyond a reasonable doubt, and thus represents an inferred measure of burden of proof. Statistical issues in the analysis and reporting of odds estimates are also discussed.</abstract><cop>Chicago, Ill</cop><pub>American Bar Association</pub><tpages>20</tpages></addata></record> |
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source | HeinOnline Law Journal Library; Periodicals Index Online; Jstor Complete Legacy |
subjects | Beyond a reasonable doubt Burden of proof Defendants Empirical evidence Geometric mean Guilty verdicts Jurors Presumption of innocence Probative value Statistical median |
title | QUANTIFYING BURDENS OF PROOF: A LIKELIHOOD RATIO APPROACH |
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