How many vendors does it take to screw down a price? a primer on competition
When creating a private market to provide a public good, government agencies can influence the market's competitive characteristics. Markets have predictable, often counter-intuitive, behaviors. Attempts to foster competition can increase or decrease costs, depending on the specific details of...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of public procurement 2005-09, Vol.5 (3), p.291-317 |
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| Hauptverfasser: | , |
| Format: | Artikel |
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| container_end_page | 317 |
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| container_issue | 3 |
| container_start_page | 291 |
| container_title | Journal of public procurement |
| container_volume | 5 |
| creator | Keisler, Jeffrey M. Buehring, William A. |
| description | When creating a private market to provide a public good, government agencies can influence the market's competitive characteristics. Markets have predictable, often counter-intuitive, behaviors. Attempts to foster competition can increase or decrease costs, depending on the specific details of the procurement situation and the specific implementation. We modeled impacts of competition where there are economies of scale and government is obligated to purchase a fixed total quantity of a good. This model estimates cost savings from several alternative plans for a buyer exploring competitive procurement. The results indicate the approximate magnitude of changes in cost that would be associated with changes in the market structure within which such procurement occurs. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1108/JOPP-05-03-2005-B001 |
| format | Article |
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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 1535-0118 |
| ispartof | Journal of public procurement, 2005-09, Vol.5 (3), p.291-317 |
| issn | 1535-0118 2150-6930 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_journals_223183379 |
| source | PAIS Index; Standard: Emerald eJournal Premier Collection |
| subjects | Bids Competition Cost control Cost reduction Economies of scale Equilibrium Government agencies Government purchasing Monopolies Prices Privatization Profits Sensitivity analysis Studies Vendors |
| title | How many vendors does it take to screw down a price? a primer on competition |
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