Optimal Monetary Policy with Countercyclical Credit Spreads

We study optimal monetary policy in a New-Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model with a credit channel and relationship lending in banking.We showthat borrowers’ bank-specific (deep) habits give rise to countercyclical credit spreads, which, in turn, make optimal monetary poli...

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Veröffentlicht in:Journal of money, credit and banking credit and banking, 2019-06, Vol.51 (4), p.787-829
Hauptverfasser: AIRAUDO, MARCO, OLIVERO, MARÍA PÍA
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description We study optimal monetary policy in a New-Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model with a credit channel and relationship lending in banking.We showthat borrowers’ bank-specific (deep) habits give rise to countercyclical credit spreads, which, in turn, make optimal monetary policy depart substantially from price stability, under both discretion and commitment. Our analysis shows that the welfare costs of setting monetary policy under discretion (with respect to the optimal Ramsey plan) and of using simpler suboptimal policy rules are strictly increasing in the magnitude of deep habits in credit markets and market power in banking.
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subjects cost channel
Credit
credit frictions
credit spreads
deep habits
E32
E44
E50
Economic models
Habits
Inflation
Markets
Monetary policy
New‐Keynesian model
optimal monetary policy
Power
Welfare
title Optimal Monetary Policy with Countercyclical Credit Spreads
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