When Less (Potential Demand) Is More (Revenue): Asymmetric Bidding Capacities in Divisible Good Auctions

We show that asymmetry in bidders’ capacity constraints plays an important role in inhibiting collusion and promoting competitive outcomes in multi-unit auctions in which the final value of the good is common knowledge. This effect appears to be related to the increased difficulty of coordination wh...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Review of Finance 2006-01, Vol.10 (3), p.389-416
Hauptverfasser:	Sade, Orly, Zender, Jaime, Schnitzlein, Charles
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Asymmetry Auctions Bids Collusion Competition Cooperation Demand Endowment Impact analysis Revenue Studies Treasuries
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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