Political Compromise and Bureaucratic Structure: The Political Origins of the Federal Reserve System
What is the origin of the structural independence of the Federal Reserve System? Unlike existing explanations on central bank independence, we show that the structural independence of the Fed is not the result of intentional design but a product of compromise among disparate groups. Using agenda-con...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of law, economics, & organization economics, & organization, 2009-10, Vol.25 (2), p.472-498 |
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Hauptverfasser: | , , |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
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Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
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