Rethinking Political Bargaining: Policymaking with a Single Proposer

Most political bargaining in the U.S. system has two features which are constitutionally mandated: (1) only one actor can make a formal proposal, and (2) he or she can make an indefinite number of proposals. Existing work in economics and political science ignores at least one of these features. I c...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Journal of law, economics, & organization economics, & organization, 2002-10, Vol.18 (2), p.411-427
1. Verfasser:	Primo, David M.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Ambivalence Bargaining Economic models Financial budgets Legislatures Mathematical models Modeling Nash equilibrium Policy making Political behavior Repeated games Spatial models Studies Uniqueness Utility functions
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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