Why Williamson Should Be a Sceptic
Timothy Williamson's epistemology leads to a fairly radical version of scepticism. According to him, all knowledge is evidence. It follows that if S knows p, the evidential probability for S that p is I. I explain Williamson's infallibilist account of perceptual knowledge, contrasting it w...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | The Philosophical quarterly 2007-10, Vol.57 (229), p.635-649 |
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| container_title | The Philosophical quarterly |
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| creator | Dodd, Dylan |
| description | Timothy Williamson's epistemology leads to a fairly radical version of scepticism. According to him, all knowledge is evidence. It follows that if S knows p, the evidential probability for S that p is I. I explain Williamson's infallibilist account of perceptual knowledge, contrasting it with Peter Klein's, and argue that Klein's account leads to a certain problem which Williamson's can avoid. Williamson can allow that perceptual knowledge is possible and that all knowledge is evidence, while at the same time avoiding Klein's problem. But while Williamson can allow that we know some things through experience, there are very many things he must say we cannot know. Given just how very many these are, he should be considered a sceptic. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1111/j.1467-9213.2007.500.x |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | The Philosophical quarterly, 2007-10, Vol.57 (229), p.635-649 |
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| language | eng |
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| source | JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing; Oxford University Press Journals All Titles (1996-Current) |
| subjects | 20th century Automobiles Belief & doubt Desks Epistemology Existence Hallucination Historical studies (History of philosophy. History of ideas) Knowledge Lotteries Philosophers Philosophy Quantum mechanics Randomness Safaris Skepticism Williamson, Timothy |
| title | Why Williamson Should Be a Sceptic |
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