The Refined Best Reply Correspondence and Backward Induction

Fixed points of the (most) refined best reply correspondence, introduced in Balkenborg et al. (2013), in the agent normal form of extensive form games with perfect recall have a remarkable property. They induce fixed points of the same correspondence in the agent normal form of every subgame. Furthe...

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Veröffentlicht in:	German economic review (Oxford) 2019-02, Vol.20 (1), p.52-66
Hauptverfasser:	Balkenborg, Dieter, Kuzmics, Christoph, Hofbauer, Josef
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	backward induction Bayesian analysis Correspondence Equilibrium Games Induction Nash equilibrium refinements Property sequential rationality Subgame perfection
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creator	Balkenborg, Dieter Kuzmics, Christoph Hofbauer, Josef
description	Fixed points of the (most) refined best reply correspondence, introduced in Balkenborg et al. (2013), in the agent normal form of extensive form games with perfect recall have a remarkable property. They induce fixed points of the same correspondence in the agent normal form of every subgame. Furthermore, in a well-defined sense, fixed points of this correspondence refine even trembling hand perfect equilibria, while, on the other hand, reasonable equilibria that are not weak perfect Bayesian equilibria are fixed points of this correspondence.
doi_str_mv	10.1111/geer.12136
format	Article
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source	Wiley Journals; De Gruyter journals
subjects	backward induction Bayesian analysis Correspondence Equilibrium Games Induction Nash equilibrium refinements Property sequential rationality Subgame perfection
title	The Refined Best Reply Correspondence and Backward Induction
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