Target Risks without Euro Exits
The Bundesbank’s Target claims arose as a result of its enforced lending to other European central banks based on Eurosystem rules. Today, it is undisputed that these claims are at risk if Target debtors leave the Eurosystem. But what about the Target risks if the euro continues to exist with all me...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | CESifo forum 2018, Vol.19 (4), p.36 |
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| creator | Fuest, Clemens Sinn, Hans-Werner |
| description | The Bundesbank’s Target claims arose as a result of its enforced lending to other European central banks based on Eurosystem rules. Today, it is undisputed that these claims are at risk if Target debtors leave the Eurosystem. But what about the Target risks if the euro continues to exist with all members? This article shows that Target balances imply real risks for credi- tor countries even if no one leaves, and it presents var- ious ways of limiting the balances. These limitations would not impair the functioning of the monetary union and the common capital market; in fact, quite the opposite is true. |
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| ispartof | CESifo forum, 2018, Vol.19 (4), p.36 |
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| language | eng |
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| source | EZB-FREE-00999 freely available EZB journals; Alma/SFX Local Collection |
| subjects | Central banks Credit risk EU membership Euro Monetary policy |
| title | Target Risks without Euro Exits |
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