Looking at OMB's Regulatory Review through a Shared Powers Perspective
Neither the advocates or critics and opponents of OMB's regulatory review satisfactorily address the issues of its constitutional legitimacy. This is because both perspectives are motivated more by political expediency than constitutionalism. They, therefore, elevate selected parts of the Const...
Gespeichert in:
Veröffentlicht in: | Presidential studies quarterly 1993-04, Vol.23 (2), p.331-345 |
---|---|
1. Verfasser: | |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
Zusammenfassung: | Neither the advocates or critics and opponents of OMB's regulatory review satisfactorily address the issues of its constitutional legitimacy. This is because both perspectives are motivated more by political expediency than constitutionalism. They, therefore, elevate selected parts of the Constitution to the exclusion of others. To overcome these shortcomings, this article suggests that the constitutional legitimacy of OMB's regulatory review can best be achieved through a shared powers perspective that recognizes that Congress has the primary responsibility for overseeing administrative lawmaking and the president has a secondary oversight responsibility consistent with his constitutionally prescribed role in the general lawmaking process. In applying a shared powers perspective to OMB's regulatory review, this article concludes that the president actually possesses the constitutional authority to veto proposed regulations that are in their final form. |
---|---|
ISSN: | 0360-4918 1741-5705 |