On the tension between full revelation and earnings management: A reconsideration of the revelation principle

The popular view that because of the revelation principle the research on earnings management must be restricted only to situations in which a truth-telling, fully revealing equilibrium does not exist is challenged. The revelation principle is presented and discussed, and conditions under which trut...

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Veröffentlicht in:Journal of accounting, auditing & finance auditing & finance, 2002-10, Vol.17 (4), p.273
Hauptverfasser: Ronen, Tavy, Varda (Lewinstein) Yaari
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container_title Journal of accounting, auditing & finance
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creator Ronen, Tavy
Varda (Lewinstein) Yaari
description The popular view that because of the revelation principle the research on earnings management must be restricted only to situations in which a truth-telling, fully revealing equilibrium does not exist is challenged. The revelation principle is presented and discussed, and conditions under which truth-telling equilibria may be dominated by equilibria wherein the message (such as earnings) is managed are stated. The revelation principle, which states that there is no loss of generality in restricting the analysis to a truth-telling, full-disclosure equilibrium, was invoked to address asymmetric information situations in which the truth is instrumental in the implementation off efficient allocations. The optimal message in an undominated equilibrium may involve either partial suppression of information (omission of some data) or aggregation (summarization of data).
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ispartof Journal of accounting, auditing & finance, 2002-10, Vol.17 (4), p.273
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2160-4061
language eng
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source Business Source Complete; Sage Journals
subjects Business ethics
Disclosure
Earnings
Equilibrium
Financial management
Payoffs
Studies
title On the tension between full revelation and earnings management: A reconsideration of the revelation principle
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