Arrow's decisive coalitions

In his classic monograph, Social Choice and Individual Values, Arrow introduced the notion of a decisive coalition of voters as part of his mathematical framework for social choice theory. The subsequent literature on Arrow's Impossibility Theorem has shown the importance for social choice theo...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Social choice and welfare 2020-03, Vol.54 (2/3), p.463-505
Hauptverfasser:	Holliday, Wesley H., Pacuit, Eric
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Coalitions Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economics Economics and Finance Game Theory Independence International Political Economy Original Paper Postulates Public Finance Rationality Representation Social and Behav. Sciences Social choice Social Policy Social values Theorems Voters
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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