The First-Order Approach to Principal-Agent Problems
The first-order approach to principal-agent problems involves relaxing the constraint that the agent choose an action which is utility maximizing to require instead only that the agent choose an action at which his utility is at a stationary point. Although more mathematically tractable, this approa...
Gespeichert in:
Veröffentlicht in: | Econometrica 1985-11, Vol.53 (6), p.1357-1367 |
---|---|
1. Verfasser: | |
Format: | Artikel |
Sprache: | eng |
Schlagworte: | |
Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
Schreiben Sie den ersten Kommentar!