Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria

This paper introduces generalized potential functions of complete information games and studies the robustness of sets of equilibria to incomplete information. A set of equilibria of a complete information game is robust if every incomplete information game where payoffs are almost always given by t...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Journal of economic theory 2005-09, Vol.124 (1), p.45-78
Hauptverfasser:	Morris, Stephen, Ui, Takashi
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Economic theory Equilibrium Games Incomplete information Potential Refinements Robustness Studies
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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