Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria

Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria

This paper introduces generalized potential functions of complete information games and studies the robustness of sets of equilibria to incomplete information. A set of equilibria of a complete information game is robust if every incomplete information game where payoffs are almost always given by t...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Journal of economic theory 2005-09, Vol.124 (1), p.45-78
Hauptverfasser: Morris, Stephen, Ui, Takashi
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Economic theory
Equilibrium
Games
Incomplete information
Potential
Refinements
Robustness
Studies
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
container_end_page 78
container_issue 1
container_start_page 45
container_title Journal of economic theory
container_volume 124
creator Morris, Stephen
Ui, Takashi
description This paper introduces generalized potential functions of complete information games and studies the robustness of sets of equilibria to incomplete information. A set of equilibria of a complete information game is robust if every incomplete information game where payoffs are almost always given by the complete information game has an equilibrium which generates behavior close to some equilibrium in the set. This paper provides sufficient conditions for the robustness of sets of equilibria in terms of argmax sets of generalized potential functions. These sufficient conditions unify and generalize existing sufficient conditions. Our generalization of potential games is useful in other game theoretic problems where potential methods have been applied.
doi_str_mv 10.1016/j.jet.2004.06.009
format Article
fullrecord <record><control><sourceid>proquest_cross</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_journals_214393434</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><els_id>S0022053104002182</els_id><sourcerecordid>885593941</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c539t-3eee659c9c674b29a2cb9b60afb7a44eb269fbcb53319f8378335a9502f2fc923</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNp9kM1KAzEUhYMoWKsP4G5wP-PN7zS4EtFaKLjRdUjSOzRDnRmTVNCnN6XiUsLJhXDOyeUj5JpCQ4Gq277pMTcMQDSgGgB9QmYUtKxbxuUpmQEwVoPk9JxcpNQDUCqVmhGxxAGj3YVv3FTTmHHIwe5SZYdNFUe3T7lKmFM1dhV-7MMuuBjsJTnrigmvfuecvD09vj481-uX5erhfl17yXWuOSIqqb32qhWOacu8006B7VxrhUDHlO6cd5JzqrsFbxecS6slsI51XjM-JzfH3imOH3tM2fTjPg7lS8Oo4JqLcuaEHk0-jilF7MwUw7uNX4aCObAxvSlszIGNAWUKm5JZHTMRJ_R_gbJvcW5xNJ-GW8pEub-KSlSWEQ6PRVORkKZdmG1-L113xy4sJD4DRpN8wMHjJkT02WzG8M8mP7INhKA</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>214393434</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria</title><source>RePEc</source><source>Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals</source><creator>Morris, Stephen ; Ui, Takashi</creator><creatorcontrib>Morris, Stephen ; Ui, Takashi</creatorcontrib><description>This paper introduces generalized potential functions of complete information games and studies the robustness of sets of equilibria to incomplete information. A set of equilibria of a complete information game is robust if every incomplete information game where payoffs are almost always given by the complete information game has an equilibrium which generates behavior close to some equilibrium in the set. This paper provides sufficient conditions for the robustness of sets of equilibria in terms of argmax sets of generalized potential functions. These sufficient conditions unify and generalize existing sufficient conditions. Our generalization of potential games is useful in other game theoretic problems where potential methods have been applied.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0022-0531</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1095-7235</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1016/j.jet.2004.06.009</identifier><identifier>CODEN: JECTAQ</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>New York: Elsevier Inc</publisher><subject>Economic theory ; Equilibrium ; Games ; Incomplete information ; Potential ; Refinements ; Robustness ; Studies</subject><ispartof>Journal of economic theory, 2005-09, Vol.124 (1), p.45-78</ispartof><rights>2004 Elsevier Inc.</rights><rights>Copyright Elsevier Science Publishing Company, Inc. Sept 2005</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c539t-3eee659c9c674b29a2cb9b60afb7a44eb269fbcb53319f8378335a9502f2fc923</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c539t-3eee659c9c674b29a2cb9b60afb7a44eb269fbcb53319f8378335a9502f2fc923</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0022053104002182$$EHTML$$P50$$Gelsevier$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,3536,3993,27903,27904,65309</link.rule.ids><backlink>$$Uhttp://econpapers.repec.org/article/eeejetheo/v_3a124_3ay_3a2005_3ai_3a1_3ap_3a45-78.htm$$DView record in RePEc$$Hfree_for_read</backlink></links><search><creatorcontrib>Morris, Stephen</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Ui, Takashi</creatorcontrib><title>Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria</title><title>Journal of economic theory</title><description>This paper introduces generalized potential functions of complete information games and studies the robustness of sets of equilibria to incomplete information. A set of equilibria of a complete information game is robust if every incomplete information game where payoffs are almost always given by the complete information game has an equilibrium which generates behavior close to some equilibrium in the set. This paper provides sufficient conditions for the robustness of sets of equilibria in terms of argmax sets of generalized potential functions. These sufficient conditions unify and generalize existing sufficient conditions. Our generalization of potential games is useful in other game theoretic problems where potential methods have been applied.</description><subject>Economic theory</subject><subject>Equilibrium</subject><subject>Games</subject><subject>Incomplete information</subject><subject>Potential</subject><subject>Refinements</subject><subject>Robustness</subject><subject>Studies</subject><issn>0022-0531</issn><issn>1095-7235</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2005</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>X2L</sourceid><recordid>eNp9kM1KAzEUhYMoWKsP4G5wP-PN7zS4EtFaKLjRdUjSOzRDnRmTVNCnN6XiUsLJhXDOyeUj5JpCQ4Gq277pMTcMQDSgGgB9QmYUtKxbxuUpmQEwVoPk9JxcpNQDUCqVmhGxxAGj3YVv3FTTmHHIwe5SZYdNFUe3T7lKmFM1dhV-7MMuuBjsJTnrigmvfuecvD09vj481-uX5erhfl17yXWuOSIqqb32qhWOacu8006B7VxrhUDHlO6cd5JzqrsFbxecS6slsI51XjM-JzfH3imOH3tM2fTjPg7lS8Oo4JqLcuaEHk0-jilF7MwUw7uNX4aCObAxvSlszIGNAWUKm5JZHTMRJ_R_gbJvcW5xNJ-GW8pEub-KSlSWEQ6PRVORkKZdmG1-L113xy4sJD4DRpN8wMHjJkT02WzG8M8mP7INhKA</recordid><startdate>20050901</startdate><enddate>20050901</enddate><creator>Morris, Stephen</creator><creator>Ui, Takashi</creator><general>Elsevier Inc</general><general>Elsevier</general><general>Elsevier Science Publishing Company, Inc</general><scope>DKI</scope><scope>X2L</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20050901</creationdate><title>Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria</title><author>Morris, Stephen ; Ui, Takashi</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c539t-3eee659c9c674b29a2cb9b60afb7a44eb269fbcb53319f8378335a9502f2fc923</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2005</creationdate><topic>Economic theory</topic><topic>Equilibrium</topic><topic>Games</topic><topic>Incomplete information</topic><topic>Potential</topic><topic>Refinements</topic><topic>Robustness</topic><topic>Studies</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Morris, Stephen</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Ui, Takashi</creatorcontrib><collection>RePEc IDEAS</collection><collection>RePEc</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>Journal of economic theory</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Morris, Stephen</au><au>Ui, Takashi</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria</atitle><jtitle>Journal of economic theory</jtitle><date>2005-09-01</date><risdate>2005</risdate><volume>124</volume><issue>1</issue><spage>45</spage><epage>78</epage><pages>45-78</pages><issn>0022-0531</issn><eissn>1095-7235</eissn><coden>JECTAQ</coden><abstract>This paper introduces generalized potential functions of complete information games and studies the robustness of sets of equilibria to incomplete information. A set of equilibria of a complete information game is robust if every incomplete information game where payoffs are almost always given by the complete information game has an equilibrium which generates behavior close to some equilibrium in the set. This paper provides sufficient conditions for the robustness of sets of equilibria in terms of argmax sets of generalized potential functions. These sufficient conditions unify and generalize existing sufficient conditions. Our generalization of potential games is useful in other game theoretic problems where potential methods have been applied.</abstract><cop>New York</cop><pub>Elsevier Inc</pub><doi>10.1016/j.jet.2004.06.009</doi><tpages>34</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record>
fulltext fulltext
identifier ISSN: 0022-0531
ispartof Journal of economic theory, 2005-09, Vol.124 (1), p.45-78
issn 0022-0531
1095-7235
language eng
recordid cdi_proquest_journals_214393434
source RePEc; Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals
subjects Economic theory
Equilibrium
Games
Incomplete information
Potential
Refinements
Robustness
Studies
title Generalized potentials and robust sets of equilibria
url https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-24T14%3A40%3A52IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_cross&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Generalized%20potentials%20and%20robust%20sets%20of%20equilibria&rft.jtitle=Journal%20of%20economic%20theory&rft.au=Morris,%20Stephen&rft.date=2005-09-01&rft.volume=124&rft.issue=1&rft.spage=45&rft.epage=78&rft.pages=45-78&rft.issn=0022-0531&rft.eissn=1095-7235&rft.coden=JECTAQ&rft_id=info:doi/10.1016/j.jet.2004.06.009&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_cross%3E885593941%3C/proquest_cross%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=214393434&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_els_id=S0022053104002182&rfr_iscdi=true