The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring
In this paper, I study a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game in which monitoring is private and imperfect. A partial folk theorem is proved for the case of almost perfect monitoring.
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of economic theory 2002-01, Vol.102 (1), p.70-83 |
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| container_end_page | 83 |
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| container_issue | 1 |
| container_start_page | 70 |
| container_title | Journal of economic theory |
| container_volume | 102 |
| creator | Piccione, Michele |
| description | In this paper, I study a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game in which monitoring is private and imperfect. A partial folk theorem is proved for the case of almost perfect monitoring. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1006/jeth.2001.2819 |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | Journal of economic theory, 2002-01, Vol.102 (1), p.70-83 |
| issn | 0022-0531 1095-7235 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_journals_214391361 |
| source | RePEc; Elsevier ScienceDirect Journals Complete |
| subjects | Economic models Game theory Statistical analysis Studies |
| title | The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring |
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