The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring

The Repeated Prisoner's Dilemma with Imperfect Private Monitoring

In this paper, I study a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game in which monitoring is private and imperfect. A partial folk theorem is proved for the case of almost perfect monitoring.

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Journal of economic theory 2002-01, Vol.102 (1), p.70-83
1. Verfasser: Piccione, Michele
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Economic models
Game theory
Statistical analysis
Studies
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
Beschreibung
Zusammenfassung:In this paper, I study a repeated Prisoner's Dilemma game in which monitoring is private and imperfect. A partial folk theorem is proved for the case of almost perfect monitoring.
ISSN:0022-0531
1095-7235
DOI:10.1006/jeth.2001.2819