The Package Assignment Model
We study assignment problems where individuals trade packages consisting of several, rather than single, objects. Although buyers' reservations values are non-additive, efficient assignments can be formulated as a linear programming problem in which the pricing functions expressing duality may...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of economic theory 2002-12, Vol.107 (2), p.377-406 |
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| container_end_page | 406 |
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| container_issue | 2 |
| container_start_page | 377 |
| container_title | Journal of economic theory |
| container_volume | 107 |
| creator | Bikhchandani, Sushil Ostroy, Joseph M. |
| description | We study assignment problems where individuals trade packages consisting of several, rather than single, objects. Although buyers' reservations values are non-additive, efficient assignments can be formulated as a linear programming problem in which the pricing functions expressing duality may be non-linear in the objects constituting the packages. The interconnections among the linear programming formulation, Walrasian equilibrium, and the core are established. In the single seller (auction) version, a necessary and sufficient condition is given for the Vickrey payoff point to be implementable by a pricing equilibrium.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: C62, D44, D51. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1006/jeth.2001.2957 |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | Journal of economic theory, 2002-12, Vol.107 (2), p.377-406 |
| issn | 0022-0531 1095-7235 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_journals_214390905 |
| source | RePEc; ScienceDirect Journals (5 years ago - present) |
| subjects | assignment model Economic models Economic theory Linear programming multi-object auctions non-linear pricing Studies the core Vickrey payments Walrasian equilibrium |
| title | The Package Assignment Model |
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