Bank capital requirements and managerial self-interest

Is there an interaction between bank capital requirements and agency problems? To which extent is the assumption of perfectly aligned bank manager–shareholders harmless? To address these questions, we consider a bank in which both a regulator–bank conflict and a shareholders–manager agency problem c...

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Veröffentlicht in:	The Quarterly review of economics and finance 2004-02, Vol.44 (1), p.77-101
Hauptverfasser:	Bris, Arturo, Cantale, Salvatore
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Agency theory Bank regulation Capital requirements Corporate control Credit policy Mathematical models Moral hazard Regulation of financial institutions Shareholder relations Stockholders Studies
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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