Optimal licensing under incomplete information: the case of the inside patent holder
We reconsider the inside patent holders' optimal licensing problem of non-drastic and (super-) drastic innovations under incomplete information, taking into account restrictions concerning royalty rates and the use of exclusive licenses implied by antitrust rules. We employ methods developed in...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Economic theory 2018-12, Vol.66 (4), p.979-1005 |
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| container_title | Economic theory |
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| creator | Fan, Cuihong Jun, Byoung Heon Wolfstetter, Elmar G. |
| description | We reconsider the inside patent holders' optimal licensing problem of non-drastic and (super-) drastic innovations under incomplete information, taking into account restrictions concerning royalty rates and the use of exclusive licenses implied by antitrust rules. We employ methods developed in the analysis of license auctions with downstream interaction and optimal control theory. Our analysis differs from the literature which assumed particular patterns of cost reductions across firms induced by the innovation and either complete information or particular probability distributions. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s00199-017-1077-5 |
| format | Article |
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| ispartof | Economic theory, 2018-12, Vol.66 (4), p.979-1005 |
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| language | eng |
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| source | SpringerLink Journals; Business Source Complete; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing |
| subjects | Control theory Economic models Economic theory Economic Theory/Quantitative Economics/Mathematical Methods Economics Economics and Finance Game Theory Innovations Licensing Microeconomics Public Finance RESEARCH ARTICLE Royalty Social and Behav. Sciences |
| title | Optimal licensing under incomplete information: the case of the inside patent holder |
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