Fundamental Singleness: How to Turn the 2nd Paralogism into a Valid Argument

[1] Experience (i.e. conscious experience) is a real concrete phenomenon. The existence of experience entails the existence of a subject of experience. Therefore subjects of experience are concretely real (or at least one is). [2] The existence of a subject of experience in the lived present or living moment of experience, e.g. the period of time in which the grasping of a thought occurs, provably involves the existence of singleness or unity of an unsurpassably strong kind. The singleness or unity in question is a metaphysically real, concrete entity. So if thoughts, or any experiences at all, really do occur or exist – and they do – then there exist entities that are genuine, concrete, metaphysical unities of an unsurpassable sort. [3] There is a metaphysically irreproachable sense in which we may – must – take these unsurpassable metaphysical unities to be themselves (a) subjects of experience, although we may also take them to be (b) thoughts or experiences. If so, there is a sound argument (using Kantian materials) to the conclusion of the 2nd Paralogism. [4] Perhaps (a) and (b) are not in the final analysis distinct. Perhaps Kant is right, in his 1772 letter to Herz, that ‘the thinking or the existence of the thought and the existence of my own self are one and the same’.