Kantian Autonomy
Kant takes autonomy to be recognizably valuable. In claiming that non-Kantian views of morality treat the morally good will as heteronomous, he intends to present an objection to these views. He expects proponents of these views to recognize that the implication of heteronomy is a serious objection;...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Royal Institute of Philosophy supplement 2004-09, Vol.55, p.137-164 |
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| container_title | Royal Institute of Philosophy supplement |
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| creator | Irwin, Terence |
| description | Kant takes autonomy to be recognizably valuable. In claiming that non-Kantian views of morality treat the morally good will as heteronomous, he intends to present an objection to these views. He expects proponents of these views to recognize that the implication of heteronomy is a serious objection; his task is not to convince them that heteronomy is bad, but to convince them that their views imply heteronomy. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1017/S1358246100008663 |
| format | Article |
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| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 1358-2461 |
| ispartof | Royal Institute of Philosophy supplement, 2004-09, Vol.55, p.137-164 |
| issn | 1358-2461 1755-3555 |
| language | eng |
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| source | Cambridge University Press Journals Complete |
| subjects | Bodily integrity Desire Goodwill Kant, Immanuel (1724-1804) Morality |
| title | Kantian Autonomy |
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