Negative News and Investor Trust: The Role of $Firm and #CEO Twitter Use
We examine how CEOs can facilitate the development of investor trust that helps mitigate the effects of negative information. Results from an experiment show that investors trust the CEO more and are more willing to invest in the firm when the CEO communicates firm news followed by a negative earnin...
Gespeichert in:
| Veröffentlicht in: | Journal of accounting research 2018-12, Vol.56 (5), p.1483-1519 |
|---|---|
| Hauptverfasser: | , , |
| Format: | Artikel |
| Sprache: | eng |
| Schlagworte: | |
| Online-Zugang: | Volltext |
| Tags: |
Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
|
| container_end_page | 1519 |
|---|---|
| container_issue | 5 |
| container_start_page | 1483 |
| container_title | Journal of accounting research |
| container_volume | 56 |
| creator | ELLIOTT, W. BROOKE GRANT, STEPHANIE M. HODGE, FRANK D. |
| description | We examine how CEOs can facilitate the development of investor trust that helps mitigate the effects of negative information. Results from an experiment show that investors trust the CEO more and are more willing to invest in the firm when the CEO communicates firm news followed by a negative earnings surprise through a personal Twitter account than when the news and surprise comes from the CEO via a website or from the firm's Investor Relations Twitter account or website. A follow-up experiment shows that repeating the negative news does not incrementally affect investors who received the news from the CEO's Twitter account, but does further negatively impact investors who received the news via other disclosure mediums, especially those who received the news via the Investor Relations Twitter account. Our results have implications for firms and executives considering the costs and benefits of communicating with investors via Twitter. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1111/1475-679X.12217 |
| format | Article |
| fullrecord | <record><control><sourceid>jstor_proqu</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_journals_2118324064</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><jstor_id>26651371</jstor_id><sourcerecordid>26651371</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c4177-5cb867c025fe9a293240d888f444bce6afa61264750afa17ab5992dde605f8843</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNqFkM9rwjAUx8PYYM7tvNMg4K7VvDS_upuITocoSIXdQmzTraLWJVXxv19rt12XywuP7-e9xwehRyBdqF4PmOSBkNF7FygFeYVaf51r1CKEQqAYF7fozvs1ISTiIbTQeGY_TJkfLZ7Zk8dml-LJ7mh9WTgcu4MvX3D8afGi2FhcZPh5lLvtJdUZDOc4PuVlaR1eenuPbjKz8fbhp7bRcjSMB-NgOn-dDPrTIGEgZcCTlRIyIZRnNjI0CikjqVIqY4ytEitMZgRQUV1Oqi9Is-JRRNPUCsIzpVjYRp1m7t4VX4fqUL0uDm5XrdQUQNXzRJ3qNanEFd47m-m9y7fGnTUQXevStRxdy9EXXRUhGuKUb-z5v7h-m_cXv-BTA65raX8gFYJDKCH8Bhhdc3U</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>2118324064</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Negative News and Investor Trust: The Role of $Firm and #CEO Twitter Use</title><source>Wiley Online Library</source><source>JSTOR</source><creator>ELLIOTT, W. BROOKE ; GRANT, STEPHANIE M. ; HODGE, FRANK D.</creator><creatorcontrib>ELLIOTT, W. BROOKE ; GRANT, STEPHANIE M. ; HODGE, FRANK D.</creatorcontrib><description>We examine how CEOs can facilitate the development of investor trust that helps mitigate the effects of negative information. Results from an experiment show that investors trust the CEO more and are more willing to invest in the firm when the CEO communicates firm news followed by a negative earnings surprise through a personal Twitter account than when the news and surprise comes from the CEO via a website or from the firm's Investor Relations Twitter account or website. A follow-up experiment shows that repeating the negative news does not incrementally affect investors who received the news from the CEO's Twitter account, but does further negatively impact investors who received the news via other disclosure mediums, especially those who received the news via the Investor Relations Twitter account. Our results have implications for firms and executives considering the costs and benefits of communicating with investors via Twitter.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0021-8456</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1475-679X</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1111/1475-679X.12217</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Chicago: Wiley Subscription Services, Inc</publisher><subject>Chief executives ; Communication ; Earnings ; G11 ; G40 ; investment decisions ; M41 ; negative earnings surprise ; Negative information ; News ; repeated information ; social bond ; social media ; Social networks ; trust ; Twitter</subject><ispartof>Journal of accounting research, 2018-12, Vol.56 (5), p.1483-1519</ispartof><rights>2018 The Accounting Research Center at the University of Chicago Booth School of Business</rights><rights>University of Chicago on behalf of the Accounting Research Center, 2018</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c4177-5cb867c025fe9a293240d888f444bce6afa61264750afa17ab5992dde605f8843</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c4177-5cb867c025fe9a293240d888f444bce6afa61264750afa17ab5992dde605f8843</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26651371$$EPDF$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/26651371$$EHTML$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,799,1411,27901,27902,45550,45551,57992,58225</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>ELLIOTT, W. BROOKE</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>GRANT, STEPHANIE M.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>HODGE, FRANK D.</creatorcontrib><title>Negative News and Investor Trust: The Role of $Firm and #CEO Twitter Use</title><title>Journal of accounting research</title><description>We examine how CEOs can facilitate the development of investor trust that helps mitigate the effects of negative information. Results from an experiment show that investors trust the CEO more and are more willing to invest in the firm when the CEO communicates firm news followed by a negative earnings surprise through a personal Twitter account than when the news and surprise comes from the CEO via a website or from the firm's Investor Relations Twitter account or website. A follow-up experiment shows that repeating the negative news does not incrementally affect investors who received the news from the CEO's Twitter account, but does further negatively impact investors who received the news via other disclosure mediums, especially those who received the news via the Investor Relations Twitter account. Our results have implications for firms and executives considering the costs and benefits of communicating with investors via Twitter.</description><subject>Chief executives</subject><subject>Communication</subject><subject>Earnings</subject><subject>G11</subject><subject>G40</subject><subject>investment decisions</subject><subject>M41</subject><subject>negative earnings surprise</subject><subject>Negative information</subject><subject>News</subject><subject>repeated information</subject><subject>social bond</subject><subject>social media</subject><subject>Social networks</subject><subject>trust</subject><subject>Twitter</subject><issn>0021-8456</issn><issn>1475-679X</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2018</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNqFkM9rwjAUx8PYYM7tvNMg4K7VvDS_upuITocoSIXdQmzTraLWJVXxv19rt12XywuP7-e9xwehRyBdqF4PmOSBkNF7FygFeYVaf51r1CKEQqAYF7fozvs1ISTiIbTQeGY_TJkfLZ7Zk8dml-LJ7mh9WTgcu4MvX3D8afGi2FhcZPh5lLvtJdUZDOc4PuVlaR1eenuPbjKz8fbhp7bRcjSMB-NgOn-dDPrTIGEgZcCTlRIyIZRnNjI0CikjqVIqY4ytEitMZgRQUV1Oqi9Is-JRRNPUCsIzpVjYRp1m7t4VX4fqUL0uDm5XrdQUQNXzRJ3qNanEFd47m-m9y7fGnTUQXevStRxdy9EXXRUhGuKUb-z5v7h-m_cXv-BTA65raX8gFYJDKCH8Bhhdc3U</recordid><startdate>20181201</startdate><enddate>20181201</enddate><creator>ELLIOTT, W. BROOKE</creator><creator>GRANT, STEPHANIE M.</creator><creator>HODGE, FRANK D.</creator><general>Wiley Subscription Services, Inc</general><general>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20181201</creationdate><title>Negative News and Investor Trust: The Role of $Firm and #CEO Twitter Use</title><author>ELLIOTT, W. BROOKE ; GRANT, STEPHANIE M. ; HODGE, FRANK D.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c4177-5cb867c025fe9a293240d888f444bce6afa61264750afa17ab5992dde605f8843</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2018</creationdate><topic>Chief executives</topic><topic>Communication</topic><topic>Earnings</topic><topic>G11</topic><topic>G40</topic><topic>investment decisions</topic><topic>M41</topic><topic>negative earnings surprise</topic><topic>Negative information</topic><topic>News</topic><topic>repeated information</topic><topic>social bond</topic><topic>social media</topic><topic>Social networks</topic><topic>trust</topic><topic>Twitter</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>ELLIOTT, W. BROOKE</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>GRANT, STEPHANIE M.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>HODGE, FRANK D.</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>Journal of accounting research</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>ELLIOTT, W. BROOKE</au><au>GRANT, STEPHANIE M.</au><au>HODGE, FRANK D.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Negative News and Investor Trust: The Role of $Firm and #CEO Twitter Use</atitle><jtitle>Journal of accounting research</jtitle><date>2018-12-01</date><risdate>2018</risdate><volume>56</volume><issue>5</issue><spage>1483</spage><epage>1519</epage><pages>1483-1519</pages><issn>0021-8456</issn><eissn>1475-679X</eissn><abstract>We examine how CEOs can facilitate the development of investor trust that helps mitigate the effects of negative information. Results from an experiment show that investors trust the CEO more and are more willing to invest in the firm when the CEO communicates firm news followed by a negative earnings surprise through a personal Twitter account than when the news and surprise comes from the CEO via a website or from the firm's Investor Relations Twitter account or website. A follow-up experiment shows that repeating the negative news does not incrementally affect investors who received the news from the CEO's Twitter account, but does further negatively impact investors who received the news via other disclosure mediums, especially those who received the news via the Investor Relations Twitter account. Our results have implications for firms and executives considering the costs and benefits of communicating with investors via Twitter.</abstract><cop>Chicago</cop><pub>Wiley Subscription Services, Inc</pub><doi>10.1111/1475-679X.12217</doi><tpages>37</tpages></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0021-8456 |
| ispartof | Journal of accounting research, 2018-12, Vol.56 (5), p.1483-1519 |
| issn | 0021-8456 1475-679X |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_journals_2118324064 |
| source | Wiley Online Library; JSTOR |
| subjects | Chief executives Communication Earnings G11 G40 investment decisions M41 negative earnings surprise Negative information News repeated information social bond social media Social networks trust |
| title | Negative News and Investor Trust: The Role of $Firm and #CEO Twitter Use |
| url | https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-02-01T10%3A40%3A07IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-jstor_proqu&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Negative%20News%20and%20Investor%20Trust:%20The%20Role%20of%20$Firm%20and%20%23CEO%20Twitter%20Use&rft.jtitle=Journal%20of%20accounting%20research&rft.au=ELLIOTT,%20W.%20BROOKE&rft.date=2018-12-01&rft.volume=56&rft.issue=5&rft.spage=1483&rft.epage=1519&rft.pages=1483-1519&rft.issn=0021-8456&rft.eissn=1475-679X&rft_id=info:doi/10.1111/1475-679X.12217&rft_dat=%3Cjstor_proqu%3E26651371%3C/jstor_proqu%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=2118324064&rft_id=info:pmid/&rft_jstor_id=26651371&rfr_iscdi=true |