Politics and Efficiency of Separating Capital and Ordinary Government Budgets
We analyze a "golden rule" that separates capital and ordinary account budgets and allows a government to finance only capital items with debt. Many national governments followed this rule in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and most U. S. states do today. We study an overlapping-g...
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Veröffentlicht in: | The Quarterly journal of economics 2006-11, Vol.121 (4), p.1167-1210 |
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description | We analyze a "golden rule" that separates capital and ordinary account budgets and allows a government to finance only capital items with debt. Many national governments followed this rule in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and most U. S. states do today. We study an overlapping-generations economy where majorities choose durable and nondurable public goods in each period. When demographics imply even moderate departures from Ricardian equivalence, the golden rule substantially improves efficiency. Examples calibrated to U. S. demographics show greater improvements at the state level or with nineteenth century demographics than under current national demographics. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1093/qje/121.4.1167 |
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S. demographics show greater improvements at the state level or with nineteenth century demographics than under current national demographics.</description><subject>Balanced budgets</subject><subject>Cost efficiency</subject><subject>Debt</subject><subject>Debt financing</subject><subject>Demographics</subject><subject>Economic efficiency</subject><subject>Economic history</subject><subject>Economic policy</subject><subject>Economic theory</subject><subject>Efficiency</subject><subject>Financial investments</subject><subject>National debt</subject><subject>Public capital</subject><subject>Public goods</subject><subject>Public investments</subject><subject>Studies</subject><subject>Taxes</subject><issn>0033-5533</issn><issn>1531-4650</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2006</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNqFkDtPwzAURi0EEqWwsiFFbAxp7fgRZ4SqlEdRkQAJsViOY1cubZLaDoJ_jyGoK9MdvvP5Xh8AThEcIVjg8XalxyhDIzJCiOV7YIAoRilhFO6DAYQYp5RifAiOvF9BCBFHZAAeHpu1DVb5RNZVMjXGKqtr9ZU0JnnSrXQy2HqZTGRrg1z_QgtX2Vq6r2TWfGhXb3QdkquuWurgj8GBkWuvT_7mELxcT58nN-l8MbudXM5ThUkeUl1BViJDK6MqBnnJy7IwplQ8J1nBNNeSsAqpHGdIwqKCWhaYEVxyqjKDOcRDcN6_27pm22kfxKrpXB1Xiiy64JDFnw7BqIeUa7x32ojW2U08XCAofoyJaExEY4KIH2OxcNEXmq79nz3r2ZUPjdvRGY3beUZinva59UF_7nLp3kVs51TcvL4JSO4mz4hRcY-_AUDGhIM</recordid><startdate>20061101</startdate><enddate>20061101</enddate><creator>Bassetto, Marco</creator><creator>Sargent, Thomas J.</creator><general>MIT Press</general><general>Oxford University Press</general><scope>BSCLL</scope><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20061101</creationdate><title>Politics and Efficiency of Separating Capital and Ordinary Government Budgets</title><author>Bassetto, Marco ; Sargent, Thomas J.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c347t-ed06b1f5dfcd608b8bb9ffbc874296e8ea46d1c7321a09d0ea93643b85c2f3803</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2006</creationdate><topic>Balanced budgets</topic><topic>Cost efficiency</topic><topic>Debt</topic><topic>Debt financing</topic><topic>Demographics</topic><topic>Economic efficiency</topic><topic>Economic history</topic><topic>Economic policy</topic><topic>Economic theory</topic><topic>Efficiency</topic><topic>Financial investments</topic><topic>National debt</topic><topic>Public capital</topic><topic>Public goods</topic><topic>Public investments</topic><topic>Studies</topic><topic>Taxes</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Bassetto, Marco</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Sargent, Thomas J.</creatorcontrib><collection>Istex</collection><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>The Quarterly journal of economics</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Bassetto, Marco</au><au>Sargent, Thomas J.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Politics and Efficiency of Separating Capital and Ordinary Government Budgets</atitle><jtitle>The Quarterly journal of economics</jtitle><stitle>The Quarterly Journal of Economics</stitle><addtitle>The Quarterly Journal of Economics</addtitle><date>2006-11-01</date><risdate>2006</risdate><volume>121</volume><issue>4</issue><spage>1167</spage><epage>1210</epage><pages>1167-1210</pages><issn>0033-5533</issn><eissn>1531-4650</eissn><coden>QJECAT</coden><abstract>We analyze a "golden rule" that separates capital and ordinary account budgets and allows a government to finance only capital items with debt. 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subjects | Balanced budgets Cost efficiency Debt Debt financing Demographics Economic efficiency Economic history Economic policy Economic theory Efficiency Financial investments National debt Public capital Public goods Public investments Studies Taxes |
title | Politics and Efficiency of Separating Capital and Ordinary Government Budgets |
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