Epistemic Norms without Voluntary Control

It is argued that the very idea of doxastic normativity is radically misconceived. An exploration of whether people truly have voluntary control over their beliefs is presented.

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Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:	Noûs (Bloomington, Indiana) Indiana), 2009-12, Vol.43 (4), p.599-632
Hauptverfasser:	Chuard, Philippe, Southwood, Nicholas
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Belief Belief & doubt Deontology Empirical evidence Epistemic justification Epistemology Epistemology. Philosophy of science. Theory of knowledge Free will Guilt Justified beliefs Logic Normativity Philosophy Propositional attitudes Volunteer labor
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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