Merger Guidelines and the Limits of Our Understanding
The merger guidelines have evolved from a structural standard for determining the legality of mergers to an open-ended evaluation that attempts to predict whether some specific harm to competition is likely. These efforts have been unsuccessful; moreover, mergers generally contribute no positive eco...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Review of industrial organization 2018-11, Vol.53 (3), p.477-506 |
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description | The merger guidelines have evolved from a structural standard for determining the legality of mergers to an open-ended evaluation that attempts to predict whether some specific harm to competition is likely. These efforts have been unsuccessful; moreover, mergers generally contribute no positive economic gain. Blocking mergers that may have little or no adverse effect on competition will not cause significant economic harm; but the failure to interdict mergers that do cause harm imposes significant costs on the economy. Merger enforcement policy should return to the structural method of the 1968 Guidelines as well as impose stricter structural standards. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s11151-018-9661-9 |
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issn | 0889-938X 1573-7160 |
language | eng |
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source | PAIS Index; Business Source Complete; Jstor Complete Legacy; SpringerLink Journals - AutoHoldings |
subjects | Acquisitions & mergers Blocking Competition Economics Economics and Finance Enforcement Industrial Organization Legality Mergers Microeconomics REGULAR PAPERS Side effects |
title | Merger Guidelines and the Limits of Our Understanding |
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