Why Be Just? The Problem of Motivation in Hegel and Rawls

At the heart of any theoretical problem of justice lies the problem of motivation: Even if we could conceive of a way to develop a comprehensive system of just laws, and even if we could rationally believe in the justice of these laws, how could we ever ensure that we—or anyone else—would be motivat...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:Ratio juris 2018-09, Vol.31 (3), p.326-345
Hauptverfasser: Fogh Nielsen, Carsten, Hartz, Emily
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
container_end_page 345
container_issue 3
container_start_page 326
container_title Ratio juris
container_volume 31
creator Fogh Nielsen, Carsten
Hartz, Emily
description At the heart of any theoretical problem of justice lies the problem of motivation: Even if we could conceive of a way to develop a comprehensive system of just laws, and even if we could rationally believe in the justice of these laws, how could we ever ensure that we—or anyone else—would be motivated to abide by them? By unearthing how the problem of motivation sways canonical discussions of justice, the article brings forth intrinsic similarities and differences in these discussions that are often overlooked in the literature. In particular, the article highlights intrinsic similarities in the analysis of the concept of justice in two central works that belong to the continental and the analytic tradition respectively and are otherwise rarely discussed together: Hegel’s Outlines of the Philosophy of Right and Rawls’s Theory of Justice.
doi_str_mv 10.1111/raju.12219
format Article
fullrecord <record><control><sourceid>proquest_cross</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_journals_2101223360</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><sourcerecordid>2101223360</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c3109-ae362feb02e6b38f11a871f52306641e2f61bd6b30bee27c4aef2b1f1416caae3</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNp9kMFOwzAMhiMEEmNw4QkicUPqiJMuXU9oTMCYhkDTJo5R2jmsU9eMpGXq25NRzvjig7_flj9CroENINSd09tmAJxDekJ6EMskSoVITkmPpUMeQQrJObnwfssYG4o07pH0Y9PSB6Szxtf3dLlB-u5sVuKOWkNfbV1867qwFS0qOsVPLKmu1nShD6W_JGdGlx6v_nqfrJ4el5NpNH97fpmM51EugKWRRiG5wYxxlJkYGQA9SsAMuWBSxoDcSMjWYcQyRJ7ksUbDMzAQg8x1SPfJTbd37-xXg75WW9u4KpxUHFj4VQjJAnXbUbmz3js0au-KnXatAqaOatRRjfpVE2Do4ENRYvsPqRbj2arL_ACPKGRZ</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>2101223360</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Why Be Just? The Problem of Motivation in Hegel and Rawls</title><source>HeinOnline Law Journal Library</source><source>Wiley Online Library All Journals</source><creator>Fogh Nielsen, Carsten ; Hartz, Emily</creator><creatorcontrib>Fogh Nielsen, Carsten ; Hartz, Emily</creatorcontrib><description>At the heart of any theoretical problem of justice lies the problem of motivation: Even if we could conceive of a way to develop a comprehensive system of just laws, and even if we could rationally believe in the justice of these laws, how could we ever ensure that we—or anyone else—would be motivated to abide by them? By unearthing how the problem of motivation sways canonical discussions of justice, the article brings forth intrinsic similarities and differences in these discussions that are often overlooked in the literature. In particular, the article highlights intrinsic similarities in the analysis of the concept of justice in two central works that belong to the continental and the analytic tradition respectively and are otherwise rarely discussed together: Hegel’s Outlines of the Philosophy of Right and Rawls’s Theory of Justice.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0952-1917</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1467-9337</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1111/raju.12219</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Oxford: Wiley Subscription Services, Inc</publisher><subject>Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770-1831) ; Justice ; Law ; Motivation ; Philosophy ; Rawls, John</subject><ispartof>Ratio juris, 2018-09, Vol.31 (3), p.326-345</ispartof><rights>2018 The Author. Ratio Juris © 2018 John Wiley &amp; Sons Ltd</rights><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c3109-ae362feb02e6b38f11a871f52306641e2f61bd6b30bee27c4aef2b1f1416caae3</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c3109-ae362feb02e6b38f11a871f52306641e2f61bd6b30bee27c4aef2b1f1416caae3</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111%2Fraju.12219$$EPDF$$P50$$Gwiley$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111%2Fraju.12219$$EHTML$$P50$$Gwiley$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,1417,27923,27924,45573,45574</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Fogh Nielsen, Carsten</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Hartz, Emily</creatorcontrib><title>Why Be Just? The Problem of Motivation in Hegel and Rawls</title><title>Ratio juris</title><description>At the heart of any theoretical problem of justice lies the problem of motivation: Even if we could conceive of a way to develop a comprehensive system of just laws, and even if we could rationally believe in the justice of these laws, how could we ever ensure that we—or anyone else—would be motivated to abide by them? By unearthing how the problem of motivation sways canonical discussions of justice, the article brings forth intrinsic similarities and differences in these discussions that are often overlooked in the literature. In particular, the article highlights intrinsic similarities in the analysis of the concept of justice in two central works that belong to the continental and the analytic tradition respectively and are otherwise rarely discussed together: Hegel’s Outlines of the Philosophy of Right and Rawls’s Theory of Justice.</description><subject>Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770-1831)</subject><subject>Justice</subject><subject>Law</subject><subject>Motivation</subject><subject>Philosophy</subject><subject>Rawls, John</subject><issn>0952-1917</issn><issn>1467-9337</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2018</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNp9kMFOwzAMhiMEEmNw4QkicUPqiJMuXU9oTMCYhkDTJo5R2jmsU9eMpGXq25NRzvjig7_flj9CroENINSd09tmAJxDekJ6EMskSoVITkmPpUMeQQrJObnwfssYG4o07pH0Y9PSB6Szxtf3dLlB-u5sVuKOWkNfbV1867qwFS0qOsVPLKmu1nShD6W_JGdGlx6v_nqfrJ4el5NpNH97fpmM51EugKWRRiG5wYxxlJkYGQA9SsAMuWBSxoDcSMjWYcQyRJ7ksUbDMzAQg8x1SPfJTbd37-xXg75WW9u4KpxUHFj4VQjJAnXbUbmz3js0au-KnXatAqaOatRRjfpVE2Do4ENRYvsPqRbj2arL_ACPKGRZ</recordid><startdate>201809</startdate><enddate>201809</enddate><creator>Fogh Nielsen, Carsten</creator><creator>Hartz, Emily</creator><general>Wiley Subscription Services, Inc</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope></search><sort><creationdate>201809</creationdate><title>Why Be Just? The Problem of Motivation in Hegel and Rawls</title><author>Fogh Nielsen, Carsten ; Hartz, Emily</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c3109-ae362feb02e6b38f11a871f52306641e2f61bd6b30bee27c4aef2b1f1416caae3</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2018</creationdate><topic>Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770-1831)</topic><topic>Justice</topic><topic>Law</topic><topic>Motivation</topic><topic>Philosophy</topic><topic>Rawls, John</topic><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Fogh Nielsen, Carsten</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Hartz, Emily</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><jtitle>Ratio juris</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Fogh Nielsen, Carsten</au><au>Hartz, Emily</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Why Be Just? The Problem of Motivation in Hegel and Rawls</atitle><jtitle>Ratio juris</jtitle><date>2018-09</date><risdate>2018</risdate><volume>31</volume><issue>3</issue><spage>326</spage><epage>345</epage><pages>326-345</pages><issn>0952-1917</issn><eissn>1467-9337</eissn><abstract>At the heart of any theoretical problem of justice lies the problem of motivation: Even if we could conceive of a way to develop a comprehensive system of just laws, and even if we could rationally believe in the justice of these laws, how could we ever ensure that we—or anyone else—would be motivated to abide by them? By unearthing how the problem of motivation sways canonical discussions of justice, the article brings forth intrinsic similarities and differences in these discussions that are often overlooked in the literature. In particular, the article highlights intrinsic similarities in the analysis of the concept of justice in two central works that belong to the continental and the analytic tradition respectively and are otherwise rarely discussed together: Hegel’s Outlines of the Philosophy of Right and Rawls’s Theory of Justice.</abstract><cop>Oxford</cop><pub>Wiley Subscription Services, Inc</pub><doi>10.1111/raju.12219</doi><tpages>20</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record>
fulltext fulltext
identifier ISSN: 0952-1917
ispartof Ratio juris, 2018-09, Vol.31 (3), p.326-345
issn 0952-1917
1467-9337
language eng
recordid cdi_proquest_journals_2101223360
source HeinOnline Law Journal Library; Wiley Online Library All Journals
subjects Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1770-1831)
Justice
Law
Motivation
Philosophy
Rawls, John
title Why Be Just? The Problem of Motivation in Hegel and Rawls
url https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-09T04%3A23%3A55IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_cross&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Why%20Be%20Just?%20The%20Problem%20of%20Motivation%20in%20Hegel%20and%20Rawls&rft.jtitle=Ratio%20juris&rft.au=Fogh%20Nielsen,%20Carsten&rft.date=2018-09&rft.volume=31&rft.issue=3&rft.spage=326&rft.epage=345&rft.pages=326-345&rft.issn=0952-1917&rft.eissn=1467-9337&rft_id=info:doi/10.1111/raju.12219&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_cross%3E2101223360%3C/proquest_cross%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=2101223360&rft_id=info:pmid/&rfr_iscdi=true