RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN TOXIC TORTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
FEDERAL PREEMPTION A. Claims That Cigarettes Are Unreasonably Dangerous Per Se Impliedly Preempted In Badon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., a Louisiana appellate court affirmed the trial court's determination that federal law imph'edly preempted plaintiffs claims that cigarettes are unreason...
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description | FEDERAL PREEMPTION A. Claims That Cigarettes Are Unreasonably Dangerous Per Se Impliedly Preempted In Badon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., a Louisiana appellate court affirmed the trial court's determination that federal law imph'edly preempted plaintiffs claims that cigarettes are unreasonably dangerous per se.1 Plaintiff sued various tobacco companies alleging that she contracted throat, larynx, and vocal cord cancer from smoking defendants' cigarettes and also alleging failure to warn, suppression, and unreasonably dangerous per se claims of recovery.2 Her sole appeal was the rejection of her claim that cigarettes are unreasonably dangerous per se, relying on a Louisiana case holding that plaintiff can recover against the manufacturer of a product if the product is unreasonably dangerous per se, i.e., too dangerous to be placed on the market. "3 Plaintiff argued that the Supreme Court's holding in Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc.4 was controlling and, in particular, that the express language in the federal cigarette labeling law barred some, but not all, common law damages actions; as such, her claim was not preempted because there was no express language forbidding application of Louisiana's unreasonably dangerous per se cause of action.5 The court disagreed, holding that Cipollone dealt with express preemption, whereas the present case dealt with implied conflict preemption.6 Ultimately, the court agreed with the trial court in concluding that plaintiffs unreasonably dangerous per se claims were preempted because "a ruling that cigarettes are unreasonably dangerous per se would have the effect of imposing a ban on the manufacture/sale of cigarettes where Congress has not enacted a ban. 7 B. Claims Barred by Michigan Statute Establishing Absolute Defense for Drugs and Their Labeling A federal court ruled in Griffus v. Novartis Pharmaceutical Corp. that Michigan's "absolute defense" for manufacturers of prescription drugs approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) barred claims by plaintiff who was harmed by a drug used in a clinical trial.8 Plaintiff claimed she suffered injuries from participating in a clinical trial sponsored by defendant for the purpose of determining whether Trileptal, approved for the treatment of seizures and epilepsy, is effective in treating pain associated with diabetic neuropathy.9 A Michigan statute provided that a product was not defective or unreasonably dangerous, and the seller was not liable, if (1) the drug was a |
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Claims That Cigarettes Are Unreasonably Dangerous Per Se Impliedly Preempted In Badon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., a Louisiana appellate court affirmed the trial court's determination that federal law imph'edly preempted plaintiffs claims that cigarettes are unreasonably dangerous per se.1 Plaintiff sued various tobacco companies alleging that she contracted throat, larynx, and vocal cord cancer from smoking defendants' cigarettes and also alleging failure to warn, suppression, and unreasonably dangerous per se claims of recovery.2 Her sole appeal was the rejection of her claim that cigarettes are unreasonably dangerous per se, relying on a Louisiana case holding that plaintiff can recover against the manufacturer of a product if the product is unreasonably dangerous per se, i.e., too dangerous to be placed on the market. "3 Plaintiff argued that the Supreme Court's holding in Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc.4 was controlling and, in particular, that the express language in the federal cigarette labeling law barred some, but not all, common law damages actions; as such, her claim was not preempted because there was no express language forbidding application of Louisiana's unreasonably dangerous per se cause of action.5 The court disagreed, holding that Cipollone dealt with express preemption, whereas the present case dealt with implied conflict preemption.6 Ultimately, the court agreed with the trial court in concluding that plaintiffs unreasonably dangerous per se claims were preempted because "a ruling that cigarettes are unreasonably dangerous per se would have the effect of imposing a ban on the manufacture/sale of cigarettes where Congress has not enacted a ban. 7 B. Claims Barred by Michigan Statute Establishing Absolute Defense for Drugs and Their Labeling A federal court ruled in Griffus v. Novartis Pharmaceutical Corp. that Michigan's "absolute defense" for manufacturers of prescription drugs approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) barred claims by plaintiff who was harmed by a drug used in a clinical trial.8 Plaintiff claimed she suffered injuries from participating in a clinical trial sponsored by defendant for the purpose of determining whether Trileptal, approved for the treatment of seizures and epilepsy, is effective in treating pain associated with diabetic neuropathy.9 A Michigan statute provided that a product was not defective or unreasonably dangerous, and the seller was not liable, if (1) the drug was approved by FDA for safety and efficacy and (2) the drug and its labeling complied with the approval at the time it left the control of the manufacturer or seller.10 Plaintiff argued that the statute was inapplicable because she was given Trileptal for a use not approved by FDA.</description><identifier>ISSN: 1543-3234</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1943-118X</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Chicago: Tort Trial and Insurance Practice Section, American Bar Association</publisher><subject>Clean Water Act-US ; Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act ; Defendants ; Environmental law ; Environmental legislation ; Federal court decisions ; Juries ; Manufacturers ; Physical trauma ; Plaintiffs ; Punitive damages ; State court decisions ; Supreme Court decisions ; Surveys ; Torts ; Toxic torts ; Trials</subject><ispartof>Tort trial & insurance practice law journal, 2008-03, Vol.43 (3), p.701-735</ispartof><rights>Copyright © 2008 American Bar Association</rights><rights>COPYRIGHT 2008 American Bar Association</rights><rights>Copyright American Bar Association Spring 2008</rights><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/25763903$$EPDF$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/25763903$$EHTML$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,803,58016,58249</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Green, Richard L.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Santangelo, Jon A.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Beams, Christian C.M.</creatorcontrib><title>RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN TOXIC TORTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW</title><title>Tort trial & insurance practice law journal</title><description>FEDERAL PREEMPTION A. Claims That Cigarettes Are Unreasonably Dangerous Per Se Impliedly Preempted In Badon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., a Louisiana appellate court affirmed the trial court's determination that federal law imph'edly preempted plaintiffs claims that cigarettes are unreasonably dangerous per se.1 Plaintiff sued various tobacco companies alleging that she contracted throat, larynx, and vocal cord cancer from smoking defendants' cigarettes and also alleging failure to warn, suppression, and unreasonably dangerous per se claims of recovery.2 Her sole appeal was the rejection of her claim that cigarettes are unreasonably dangerous per se, relying on a Louisiana case holding that plaintiff can recover against the manufacturer of a product if the product is unreasonably dangerous per se, i.e., too dangerous to be placed on the market. "3 Plaintiff argued that the Supreme Court's holding in Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc.4 was controlling and, in particular, that the express language in the federal cigarette labeling law barred some, but not all, common law damages actions; as such, her claim was not preempted because there was no express language forbidding application of Louisiana's unreasonably dangerous per se cause of action.5 The court disagreed, holding that Cipollone dealt with express preemption, whereas the present case dealt with implied conflict preemption.6 Ultimately, the court agreed with the trial court in concluding that plaintiffs unreasonably dangerous per se claims were preempted because "a ruling that cigarettes are unreasonably dangerous per se would have the effect of imposing a ban on the manufacture/sale of cigarettes where Congress has not enacted a ban. 7 B. Claims Barred by Michigan Statute Establishing Absolute Defense for Drugs and Their Labeling A federal court ruled in Griffus v. Novartis Pharmaceutical Corp. that Michigan's "absolute defense" for manufacturers of prescription drugs approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) barred claims by plaintiff who was harmed by a drug used in a clinical trial.8 Plaintiff claimed she suffered injuries from participating in a clinical trial sponsored by defendant for the purpose of determining whether Trileptal, approved for the treatment of seizures and epilepsy, is effective in treating pain associated with diabetic neuropathy.9 A Michigan statute provided that a product was not defective or unreasonably dangerous, and the seller was not liable, if (1) the drug was approved by FDA for safety and efficacy and (2) the drug and its labeling complied with the approval at the time it left the control of the manufacturer or seller.10 Plaintiff argued that the statute was inapplicable because she was given Trileptal for a use not approved by FDA.</description><subject>Clean Water Act-US</subject><subject>Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act</subject><subject>Defendants</subject><subject>Environmental law</subject><subject>Environmental legislation</subject><subject>Federal court decisions</subject><subject>Juries</subject><subject>Manufacturers</subject><subject>Physical trauma</subject><subject>Plaintiffs</subject><subject>Punitive damages</subject><subject>State court decisions</subject><subject>Supreme Court decisions</subject><subject>Surveys</subject><subject>Torts</subject><subject>Toxic torts</subject><subject>Trials</subject><issn>1543-3234</issn><issn>1943-118X</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2008</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>8G5</sourceid><sourceid>ABUWG</sourceid><sourceid>AFKRA</sourceid><sourceid>AZQEC</sourceid><sourceid>BENPR</sourceid><sourceid>CCPQU</sourceid><sourceid>DWQXO</sourceid><sourceid>GNUQQ</sourceid><sourceid>GUQSH</sourceid><sourceid>M2O</sourceid><recordid>eNptjVFPg0AMx4nRxDn9CCZEnzHX6x0Hj4ThJEEwiHNv5IBjYdlgHuzBb--Z-WKytGn_bX9tL6wZ-AwdAG99aTQ3Gimya-tmHLeEIAifzSwvj8IoLexFtIqS7O3V6Hc7Tu0iW8ehibkpg3RhR-kqzrP0dx4kdhJ83lpXrdyN6u4vz62P56gIX5wkW8ZhkDgb81I4tKkb5gIAk9LntWhoS9yKqYYSV0nwjFecKlpjUxEmCErCQaDHK6IIcwnOrYfT3YMevo5qnMrtcNS9eVlSIEDBo8JAjydoI3eq7Pp2mLSs991YlwF4LgeOCIZyzlAb1Sstd0Ov2s60__FPZ3hjjdp39dmF-9PCdpwGXR50t5f6u6RcuOgTxB8X6HDt</recordid><startdate>20080322</startdate><enddate>20080322</enddate><creator>Green, Richard L.</creator><creator>Santangelo, Jon A.</creator><creator>Beams, Christian C.M.</creator><general>Tort Trial and Insurance Practice Section, American Bar Association</general><general>American Bar Association</general><scope>ILT</scope><scope>3V.</scope><scope>7X7</scope><scope>7XB</scope><scope>88E</scope><scope>8FI</scope><scope>8FJ</scope><scope>8FK</scope><scope>8G5</scope><scope>ABUWG</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>AZQEC</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>FYUFA</scope><scope>GHDGH</scope><scope>GNUQQ</scope><scope>GUQSH</scope><scope>K9.</scope><scope>M0S</scope><scope>M1P</scope><scope>M2O</scope><scope>MBDVC</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>PRINS</scope><scope>Q9U</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20080322</creationdate><title>RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN TOXIC TORTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW</title><author>Green, Richard L. ; Santangelo, Jon A. ; Beams, Christian C.M.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-g1547-2dcd461114aa95c7d2f06b4ed206ea18a18b52e2c3db04703a0517385b0e04603</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2008</creationdate><topic>Clean Water Act-US</topic><topic>Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act</topic><topic>Defendants</topic><topic>Environmental law</topic><topic>Environmental legislation</topic><topic>Federal court decisions</topic><topic>Juries</topic><topic>Manufacturers</topic><topic>Physical trauma</topic><topic>Plaintiffs</topic><topic>Punitive damages</topic><topic>State court decisions</topic><topic>Supreme Court decisions</topic><topic>Surveys</topic><topic>Torts</topic><topic>Toxic torts</topic><topic>Trials</topic><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Green, Richard L.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Santangelo, Jon A.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Beams, Christian C.M.</creatorcontrib><collection>Gale OneFile: LegalTrac</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Corporate)</collection><collection>Health & Medical Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>Medical Database (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>Hospital Premium Collection</collection><collection>Hospital Premium Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni) (purchase pre-March 2016)</collection><collection>Research Library (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central UK/Ireland</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Essentials</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>ProQuest One Community College</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Korea</collection><collection>Health Research Premium Collection</collection><collection>Health Research Premium Collection (Alumni)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Student</collection><collection>Research Library Prep</collection><collection>ProQuest Health & Medical Complete (Alumni)</collection><collection>Health & Medical Collection (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>Medical Database</collection><collection>Research Library</collection><collection>Research Library (Corporate)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic Eastern Edition (DO NOT USE)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic UKI Edition</collection><collection>ProQuest Central China</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Basic</collection><jtitle>Tort trial & insurance practice law journal</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Green, Richard L.</au><au>Santangelo, Jon A.</au><au>Beams, Christian C.M.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN TOXIC TORTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW</atitle><jtitle>Tort trial & insurance practice law journal</jtitle><date>2008-03-22</date><risdate>2008</risdate><volume>43</volume><issue>3</issue><spage>701</spage><epage>735</epage><pages>701-735</pages><issn>1543-3234</issn><eissn>1943-118X</eissn><abstract>FEDERAL PREEMPTION A. Claims That Cigarettes Are Unreasonably Dangerous Per Se Impliedly Preempted In Badon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., a Louisiana appellate court affirmed the trial court's determination that federal law imph'edly preempted plaintiffs claims that cigarettes are unreasonably dangerous per se.1 Plaintiff sued various tobacco companies alleging that she contracted throat, larynx, and vocal cord cancer from smoking defendants' cigarettes and also alleging failure to warn, suppression, and unreasonably dangerous per se claims of recovery.2 Her sole appeal was the rejection of her claim that cigarettes are unreasonably dangerous per se, relying on a Louisiana case holding that plaintiff can recover against the manufacturer of a product if the product is unreasonably dangerous per se, i.e., too dangerous to be placed on the market. "3 Plaintiff argued that the Supreme Court's holding in Cipollone v. Liggett Group Inc.4 was controlling and, in particular, that the express language in the federal cigarette labeling law barred some, but not all, common law damages actions; as such, her claim was not preempted because there was no express language forbidding application of Louisiana's unreasonably dangerous per se cause of action.5 The court disagreed, holding that Cipollone dealt with express preemption, whereas the present case dealt with implied conflict preemption.6 Ultimately, the court agreed with the trial court in concluding that plaintiffs unreasonably dangerous per se claims were preempted because "a ruling that cigarettes are unreasonably dangerous per se would have the effect of imposing a ban on the manufacture/sale of cigarettes where Congress has not enacted a ban. 7 B. Claims Barred by Michigan Statute Establishing Absolute Defense for Drugs and Their Labeling A federal court ruled in Griffus v. Novartis Pharmaceutical Corp. that Michigan's "absolute defense" for manufacturers of prescription drugs approved by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) barred claims by plaintiff who was harmed by a drug used in a clinical trial.8 Plaintiff claimed she suffered injuries from participating in a clinical trial sponsored by defendant for the purpose of determining whether Trileptal, approved for the treatment of seizures and epilepsy, is effective in treating pain associated with diabetic neuropathy.9 A Michigan statute provided that a product was not defective or unreasonably dangerous, and the seller was not liable, if (1) the drug was approved by FDA for safety and efficacy and (2) the drug and its labeling complied with the approval at the time it left the control of the manufacturer or seller.10 Plaintiff argued that the statute was inapplicable because she was given Trileptal for a use not approved by FDA.</abstract><cop>Chicago</cop><pub>Tort Trial and Insurance Practice Section, American Bar Association</pub><tpages>35</tpages></addata></record> |
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ispartof | Tort trial & insurance practice law journal, 2008-03, Vol.43 (3), p.701-735 |
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language | eng |
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source | HeinOnline Law Journal Library; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing |
subjects | Clean Water Act-US Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and Liability Act Defendants Environmental law Environmental legislation Federal court decisions Juries Manufacturers Physical trauma Plaintiffs Punitive damages State court decisions Supreme Court decisions Surveys Torts Toxic torts Trials |
title | RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN TOXIC TORTS AND ENVIRONMENTAL LAW |
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