Electoral Handouts in Mumbai Elections: The Cost of Political Competition
Why do candidates give voters handouts during political campaigns? Drawing on qualitative data from Mumbai, this article argues that competitive elections prompt candidates to distribute handouts for strategic reasons. While they know handouts to be inefficient, candidates face a prisoner's dil...
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Veröffentlicht in: | Asian survey 2018-03, Vol.58 (2), p.341-364 |
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description | Why do candidates give voters handouts during political campaigns? Drawing on qualitative data from Mumbai, this article argues that competitive elections prompt candidates to distribute handouts for strategic reasons. While they know handouts to be inefficient, candidates face a prisoner's dilemma. Fearing that their opponents will distribute handouts, they distribute them themselves to counter, or neutralize, their opponents' strategies. |
doi_str_mv | 10.1525/AS.2018.58.2.341 |
format | Article |
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source | PAIS Index; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; JSTOR |
subjects | Campaign expenditures Candidates Competition Decentralization Elections Electoral reform Game theory Legitimacy Political campaigns Representation Voters |
title | Electoral Handouts in Mumbai Elections: The Cost of Political Competition |
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