Unraveling the Evolution of Defectors in Online Business Games

Anonymous online business environments have a social dilemma situation in it. A dilemma on whether to cooperate or Defect. Defection by a buyer to seller and/or seller to buyer might give each a better profit at the cost of the loss of other. However, if these parties were to interact in future too,...

Ausführliche Beschreibung

Gespeichert in:
Bibliographische Detailangaben
Veröffentlicht in:arXiv.org 2013-05
Hauptverfasser: Bista, Sanat Kumar, Dahal, Keshav P, Cowling, Peter I, Tuladhar, Bhadra Man
Format: Artikel
Sprache:eng
Schlagworte:
Online-Zugang:Volltext
Tags: Tag hinzufügen
Keine Tags, Fügen Sie den ersten Tag hinzu!
container_end_page
container_issue
container_start_page
container_title arXiv.org
container_volume
creator Bista, Sanat Kumar
Dahal, Keshav P
Cowling, Peter I
Tuladhar, Bhadra Man
description Anonymous online business environments have a social dilemma situation in it. A dilemma on whether to cooperate or Defect. Defection by a buyer to seller and/or seller to buyer might give each a better profit at the cost of the loss of other. However, if these parties were to interact in future too, a bad past reference might prevent cooperative actions, thus depriving each other from a better gain. The anonymity of the players and an absence of central governing body still make this environment tempting for the defectors. What might be the evolutionary behavior of defectors in such environment? How could their increasing population be controlled? It is these two questions basically that we attempt to address in this research work. A genetic algorithm based spatial iterated prisoners dilemma (SIPD) environment has been used to simulate the experiments. A case where compensation for the looser is provided by the system is modeled and analyzed through experiments. Our results show that compensation can be useful in decreasing defective population in the society, however, this might not be enough for the evolution of a cooperative and reliable society of trustworthy players.
format Article
fullrecord <record><control><sourceid>proquest</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_proquest_journals_2085221652</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><sourcerecordid>2085221652</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-proquest_journals_20852216523</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNqNyrEOgjAQgOHGxESivMMlziTlSpHJQUXdXHQmjTkUgq32Wp5fBh_A6Rv-fyYSVCrPqgJxIVLmXkqJ5Qa1VonY3qw3Iw2dfUB4EtSjG2LonAXXwoFaugfnGToLFztNBLvIE8xwMi_ilZi3ZmBKfy7F-lhf9-fs7d0nEoemd9HbKTUoK42YlxrVf9cXqRM4Dw</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>2085221652</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Unraveling the Evolution of Defectors in Online Business Games</title><source>Free E- Journals</source><creator>Bista, Sanat Kumar ; Dahal, Keshav P ; Cowling, Peter I ; Tuladhar, Bhadra Man</creator><creatorcontrib>Bista, Sanat Kumar ; Dahal, Keshav P ; Cowling, Peter I ; Tuladhar, Bhadra Man</creatorcontrib><description>Anonymous online business environments have a social dilemma situation in it. A dilemma on whether to cooperate or Defect. Defection by a buyer to seller and/or seller to buyer might give each a better profit at the cost of the loss of other. However, if these parties were to interact in future too, a bad past reference might prevent cooperative actions, thus depriving each other from a better gain. The anonymity of the players and an absence of central governing body still make this environment tempting for the defectors. What might be the evolutionary behavior of defectors in such environment? How could their increasing population be controlled? It is these two questions basically that we attempt to address in this research work. A genetic algorithm based spatial iterated prisoners dilemma (SIPD) environment has been used to simulate the experiments. A case where compensation for the looser is provided by the system is modeled and analyzed through experiments. Our results show that compensation can be useful in decreasing defective population in the society, however, this might not be enough for the evolution of a cooperative and reliable society of trustworthy players.</description><identifier>EISSN: 2331-8422</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Ithaca: Cornell University Library, arXiv.org</publisher><subject>Compensation ; Computer &amp; video games ; Computer simulation ; Evolution ; Genetic algorithms ; Political asylum ; Prisoners ; Privacy ; Trustworthiness</subject><ispartof>arXiv.org, 2013-05</ispartof><rights>2013. This work is published under http://arxiv.org/licenses/nonexclusive-distrib/1.0/ (the “License”). Notwithstanding the ProQuest Terms and Conditions, you may use this content in accordance with the terms of the License.</rights><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>780,784</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Bista, Sanat Kumar</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Dahal, Keshav P</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Cowling, Peter I</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Tuladhar, Bhadra Man</creatorcontrib><title>Unraveling the Evolution of Defectors in Online Business Games</title><title>arXiv.org</title><description>Anonymous online business environments have a social dilemma situation in it. A dilemma on whether to cooperate or Defect. Defection by a buyer to seller and/or seller to buyer might give each a better profit at the cost of the loss of other. However, if these parties were to interact in future too, a bad past reference might prevent cooperative actions, thus depriving each other from a better gain. The anonymity of the players and an absence of central governing body still make this environment tempting for the defectors. What might be the evolutionary behavior of defectors in such environment? How could their increasing population be controlled? It is these two questions basically that we attempt to address in this research work. A genetic algorithm based spatial iterated prisoners dilemma (SIPD) environment has been used to simulate the experiments. A case where compensation for the looser is provided by the system is modeled and analyzed through experiments. Our results show that compensation can be useful in decreasing defective population in the society, however, this might not be enough for the evolution of a cooperative and reliable society of trustworthy players.</description><subject>Compensation</subject><subject>Computer &amp; video games</subject><subject>Computer simulation</subject><subject>Evolution</subject><subject>Genetic algorithms</subject><subject>Political asylum</subject><subject>Prisoners</subject><subject>Privacy</subject><subject>Trustworthiness</subject><issn>2331-8422</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2013</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>ABUWG</sourceid><sourceid>AFKRA</sourceid><sourceid>AZQEC</sourceid><sourceid>BENPR</sourceid><sourceid>CCPQU</sourceid><sourceid>DWQXO</sourceid><recordid>eNqNyrEOgjAQgOHGxESivMMlziTlSpHJQUXdXHQmjTkUgq32Wp5fBh_A6Rv-fyYSVCrPqgJxIVLmXkqJ5Qa1VonY3qw3Iw2dfUB4EtSjG2LonAXXwoFaugfnGToLFztNBLvIE8xwMi_ilZi3ZmBKfy7F-lhf9-fs7d0nEoemd9HbKTUoK42YlxrVf9cXqRM4Dw</recordid><startdate>20130514</startdate><enddate>20130514</enddate><creator>Bista, Sanat Kumar</creator><creator>Dahal, Keshav P</creator><creator>Cowling, Peter I</creator><creator>Tuladhar, Bhadra Man</creator><general>Cornell University Library, arXiv.org</general><scope>8FE</scope><scope>8FG</scope><scope>ABJCF</scope><scope>ABUWG</scope><scope>AFKRA</scope><scope>AZQEC</scope><scope>BENPR</scope><scope>BGLVJ</scope><scope>CCPQU</scope><scope>DWQXO</scope><scope>HCIFZ</scope><scope>L6V</scope><scope>M7S</scope><scope>PIMPY</scope><scope>PQEST</scope><scope>PQQKQ</scope><scope>PQUKI</scope><scope>PRINS</scope><scope>PTHSS</scope></search><sort><creationdate>20130514</creationdate><title>Unraveling the Evolution of Defectors in Online Business Games</title><author>Bista, Sanat Kumar ; Dahal, Keshav P ; Cowling, Peter I ; Tuladhar, Bhadra Man</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-proquest_journals_20852216523</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2013</creationdate><topic>Compensation</topic><topic>Computer &amp; video games</topic><topic>Computer simulation</topic><topic>Evolution</topic><topic>Genetic algorithms</topic><topic>Political asylum</topic><topic>Prisoners</topic><topic>Privacy</topic><topic>Trustworthiness</topic><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Bista, Sanat Kumar</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Dahal, Keshav P</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Cowling, Peter I</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Tuladhar, Bhadra Man</creatorcontrib><collection>ProQuest SciTech Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Technology Collection</collection><collection>Materials Science &amp; Engineering Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Central (Alumni Edition)</collection><collection>ProQuest Central UK/Ireland</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Essentials</collection><collection>ProQuest Central</collection><collection>Technology Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest One Community College</collection><collection>ProQuest Central Korea</collection><collection>SciTech Premium Collection</collection><collection>ProQuest Engineering Collection</collection><collection>Engineering Database</collection><collection>Publicly Available Content Database</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic Eastern Edition (DO NOT USE)</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic</collection><collection>ProQuest One Academic UKI Edition</collection><collection>ProQuest Central China</collection><collection>Engineering Collection</collection></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Bista, Sanat Kumar</au><au>Dahal, Keshav P</au><au>Cowling, Peter I</au><au>Tuladhar, Bhadra Man</au><format>book</format><genre>document</genre><ristype>GEN</ristype><atitle>Unraveling the Evolution of Defectors in Online Business Games</atitle><jtitle>arXiv.org</jtitle><date>2013-05-14</date><risdate>2013</risdate><eissn>2331-8422</eissn><abstract>Anonymous online business environments have a social dilemma situation in it. A dilemma on whether to cooperate or Defect. Defection by a buyer to seller and/or seller to buyer might give each a better profit at the cost of the loss of other. However, if these parties were to interact in future too, a bad past reference might prevent cooperative actions, thus depriving each other from a better gain. The anonymity of the players and an absence of central governing body still make this environment tempting for the defectors. What might be the evolutionary behavior of defectors in such environment? How could their increasing population be controlled? It is these two questions basically that we attempt to address in this research work. A genetic algorithm based spatial iterated prisoners dilemma (SIPD) environment has been used to simulate the experiments. A case where compensation for the looser is provided by the system is modeled and analyzed through experiments. Our results show that compensation can be useful in decreasing defective population in the society, however, this might not be enough for the evolution of a cooperative and reliable society of trustworthy players.</abstract><cop>Ithaca</cop><pub>Cornell University Library, arXiv.org</pub><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record>
fulltext fulltext
identifier EISSN: 2331-8422
ispartof arXiv.org, 2013-05
issn 2331-8422
language eng
recordid cdi_proquest_journals_2085221652
source Free E- Journals
subjects Compensation
Computer & video games
Computer simulation
Evolution
Genetic algorithms
Political asylum
Prisoners
Privacy
Trustworthiness
title Unraveling the Evolution of Defectors in Online Business Games
url https://sfx.bib-bvb.de/sfx_tum?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-13T13%3A11%3A48IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:book&rft.genre=document&rft.atitle=Unraveling%20the%20Evolution%20of%20Defectors%20in%20Online%20Business%20Games&rft.jtitle=arXiv.org&rft.au=Bista,%20Sanat%20Kumar&rft.date=2013-05-14&rft.eissn=2331-8422&rft_id=info:doi/&rft_dat=%3Cproquest%3E2085221652%3C/proquest%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&disable_directlink=true&sfx.directlink=off&sfx.report_link=0&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=2085221652&rft_id=info:pmid/&rfr_iscdi=true