Contracting Experts With Unknown Cost Structures
We investigate the problem of a principal looking to contract an expert to provide a probability forecast for a categorical event. We assume all experts have a common public prior on the event's probability, but can form more accurate opinions by engaging in research. Various experts' rese...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | arXiv.org 2014-04 |
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| creator | Braverman, Mark Gal Oshri |
| description | We investigate the problem of a principal looking to contract an expert to provide a probability forecast for a categorical event. We assume all experts have a common public prior on the event's probability, but can form more accurate opinions by engaging in research. Various experts' research costs are unknown to the principal. We present a truthful and efficient mechanism for the principal's problem of contracting an expert. This results in the principal contracting the best expert to do the work, and the principal's expected utility is equivalent to having the second best expert in-house. Our mechanism connects scoring rules with auctions, a connection that is useful when obtaining new information requires costly research. |
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| subjects | Contraction Expected utility Experts |
| title | Contracting Experts With Unknown Cost Structures |
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