Enforcement Process Tracing: Forbearance and Dilution in Urban Colombia and Turkey
Cities are complex regulatory environments. Attempts to regulate urban behavior create opportunities for politicians to manipulate enforcement to win votes and reward supporters. While some politicians choose not to enforce regulations, or forbearance , others undercut their intent, or dilution . Em...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Studies in comparative international development 2018-09, Vol.53 (3), p.300-323 |
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| creator | Bozçağa, Tuğba Holland, Alisha C. |
| description | Cities are complex regulatory environments. Attempts to regulate urban behavior create opportunities for politicians to manipulate enforcement to win votes and reward supporters. While some politicians choose not to enforce regulations, or
forbearance
, others undercut their intent, or
dilution
. Empirical research on enforcement has lagged behind due to the identification challenges in distinguishing weak state capacity from political manipulations. We develop a structured approach to process tracing that follows enforcement decisions sequentially across bureaucracies and specifies statistical distributions as counterfactuals to identify the causes of limited enforcement. We illustrate these strategies through original data on enforcement against squatters in urban Colombia and the provision of building permits in urban Turkey. Enforcement process tracing helps to document a form of distributive politics that is common to cities in the developing world. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1007/s12116-018-9274-1 |
| format | Article |
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forbearance
, others undercut their intent, or
dilution
. Empirical research on enforcement has lagged behind due to the identification challenges in distinguishing weak state capacity from political manipulations. We develop a structured approach to process tracing that follows enforcement decisions sequentially across bureaucracies and specifies statistical distributions as counterfactuals to identify the causes of limited enforcement. We illustrate these strategies through original data on enforcement against squatters in urban Colombia and the provision of building permits in urban Turkey. Enforcement process tracing helps to document a form of distributive politics that is common to cities in the developing world.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0039-3606</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1936-6167</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1007/s12116-018-9274-1</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>New York: Springer US</publisher><subject>Bureaucracy ; Cities ; Dilution ; Enforcement ; Forbearance ; Frequency distribution ; Identification ; Politicians ; Politics ; Regulation ; Research methodology ; Social Sciences ; Squatters ; Statistical distributions ; Supporters ; Voter behavior ; Voting</subject><ispartof>Studies in comparative international development, 2018-09, Vol.53 (3), p.300-323</ispartof><rights>Springer Science+Business Media, LLC, part of Springer Nature 2018</rights><rights>COPYRIGHT 2018 Springer</rights><rights>Studies in Comparative International Development is a copyright of Springer, (2018). All Rights Reserved.</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><oa>free_for_read</oa><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c500t-921425e547934290a7739574dfba27d64362bda4f87593361a612416490cdf913</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c500t-921425e547934290a7739574dfba27d64362bda4f87593361a612416490cdf913</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007/s12116-018-9274-1$$EPDF$$P50$$Gspringer$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://link.springer.com/10.1007/s12116-018-9274-1$$EHTML$$P50$$Gspringer$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,12825,12826,27845,27903,27904,30978,41467,42536,51297</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Bozçağa, Tuğba</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Holland, Alisha C.</creatorcontrib><title>Enforcement Process Tracing: Forbearance and Dilution in Urban Colombia and Turkey</title><title>Studies in comparative international development</title><addtitle>St Comp Int Dev</addtitle><description>Cities are complex regulatory environments. Attempts to regulate urban behavior create opportunities for politicians to manipulate enforcement to win votes and reward supporters. While some politicians choose not to enforce regulations, or
forbearance
, others undercut their intent, or
dilution
. Empirical research on enforcement has lagged behind due to the identification challenges in distinguishing weak state capacity from political manipulations. We develop a structured approach to process tracing that follows enforcement decisions sequentially across bureaucracies and specifies statistical distributions as counterfactuals to identify the causes of limited enforcement. We illustrate these strategies through original data on enforcement against squatters in urban Colombia and the provision of building permits in urban Turkey. 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forbearance
, others undercut their intent, or
dilution
. Empirical research on enforcement has lagged behind due to the identification challenges in distinguishing weak state capacity from political manipulations. We develop a structured approach to process tracing that follows enforcement decisions sequentially across bureaucracies and specifies statistical distributions as counterfactuals to identify the causes of limited enforcement. We illustrate these strategies through original data on enforcement against squatters in urban Colombia and the provision of building permits in urban Turkey. Enforcement process tracing helps to document a form of distributive politics that is common to cities in the developing world.</abstract><cop>New York</cop><pub>Springer US</pub><doi>10.1007/s12116-018-9274-1</doi><tpages>24</tpages><oa>free_for_read</oa></addata></record> |
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| language | eng |
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| source | PAIS Index; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; Business Source Complete; Applied Social Sciences Index & Abstracts (ASSIA); Springer Nature - Complete Springer Journals; Political Science Complete |
| subjects | Bureaucracy Cities Dilution Enforcement Forbearance Frequency distribution Identification Politicians Politics Regulation Research methodology Social Sciences Squatters Statistical distributions Supporters Voter behavior Voting |
| title | Enforcement Process Tracing: Forbearance and Dilution in Urban Colombia and Turkey |
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