Management Ownership and Firm Compensation Policy: Evidence from Converting Savings and Loan Associations
We examine the relationship between management ownership and compensation for a sample of savings and loan associations which have recently converted to stock organizations. Previous expense preference literature has indicated that the stock form of organization lessens the potential for non-value-m...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Financial management 1991-12, Vol.20 (4), p.80-90 |
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| creator | Carter, Richard B. Stover, Roger D. |
| description | We examine the relationship between management ownership and compensation for a sample of savings and loan associations which have recently converted to stock organizations. Previous expense preference literature has indicated that the stock form of organization lessens the potential for non-value-maximizing behavior that may be manifested in the payment of employee compensation. Our results confirm those of Mørck, et al, which suggest that support for the convergence of interests hypothesis (management acts in the interests of the owners) and the entrenchment hypotheses (management acts in its own interests) is conditional on the magnitude of management ownership in the firm. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.2307/3665714 |
| format | Article |
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Previous expense preference literature has indicated that the stock form of organization lessens the potential for non-value-maximizing behavior that may be manifested in the payment of employee compensation. Our results confirm those of Mørck, et al, which suggest that support for the convergence of interests hypothesis (management acts in the interests of the owners) and the entrenchment hypotheses (management acts in its own interests) is conditional on the magnitude of management ownership in the firm.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0046-3892</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1755-053X</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.2307/3665714</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Albany, N.Y: Financial Management Association</publisher><subject>Asset income ; Bank loans ; Banks ; Business management ; Coefficients ; Compensation ; Compensation management ; Corporate Compensation Policy Special Issue ; Corporate reorganization ; Financial institutions ; Financial management ; Home loans ; Impacts ; Management ; Manager behavior ; Mathematical models ; Metropolitan statistical areas ; Organizational structure ; Ownership ; Profitability ; Profits ; Regulation ; Savings & loan associations ; Savings and loan associations ; Studies ; Variable coefficients ; Wages</subject><ispartof>Financial management, 1991-12, Vol.20 (4), p.80-90</ispartof><rights>Copyright 1991 Financial Management Association</rights><rights>COPYRIGHT 1991 Financial Management Association</rights><rights>Copyright Financial Management Association Winter 1991</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c337t-f4170d7984a0ab8d40201e19be5cb10ffb042fa08fb2c4978e81b6db5175c8eb3</citedby></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/3665714$$EPDF$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://www.jstor.org/stable/3665714$$EHTML$$P50$$Gjstor$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,803,27869,27924,27925,58017,58250</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Carter, Richard B.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Stover, Roger D.</creatorcontrib><title>Management Ownership and Firm Compensation Policy: Evidence from Converting Savings and Loan Associations</title><title>Financial management</title><description>We examine the relationship between management ownership and compensation for a sample of savings and loan associations which have recently converted to stock organizations. Previous expense preference literature has indicated that the stock form of organization lessens the potential for non-value-maximizing behavior that may be manifested in the payment of employee compensation. Our results confirm those of Mørck, et al, which suggest that support for the convergence of interests hypothesis (management acts in the interests of the owners) and the entrenchment hypotheses (management acts in its own interests) is conditional on the magnitude of management ownership in the firm.</description><subject>Asset income</subject><subject>Bank loans</subject><subject>Banks</subject><subject>Business management</subject><subject>Coefficients</subject><subject>Compensation</subject><subject>Compensation management</subject><subject>Corporate Compensation Policy Special Issue</subject><subject>Corporate reorganization</subject><subject>Financial institutions</subject><subject>Financial management</subject><subject>Home loans</subject><subject>Impacts</subject><subject>Management</subject><subject>Manager behavior</subject><subject>Mathematical models</subject><subject>Metropolitan statistical areas</subject><subject>Organizational 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management</jtitle><date>1991-12-01</date><risdate>1991</risdate><volume>20</volume><issue>4</issue><spage>80</spage><epage>90</epage><pages>80-90</pages><issn>0046-3892</issn><eissn>1755-053X</eissn><abstract>We examine the relationship between management ownership and compensation for a sample of savings and loan associations which have recently converted to stock organizations. Previous expense preference literature has indicated that the stock form of organization lessens the potential for non-value-maximizing behavior that may be manifested in the payment of employee compensation. Our results confirm those of Mørck, et al, which suggest that support for the convergence of interests hypothesis (management acts in the interests of the owners) and the entrenchment hypotheses (management acts in its own interests) is conditional on the magnitude of management ownership in the firm.</abstract><cop>Albany, N.Y</cop><pub>Financial Management Association</pub><doi>10.2307/3665714</doi><tpages>11</tpages></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0046-3892 |
| ispartof | Financial management, 1991-12, Vol.20 (4), p.80-90 |
| issn | 0046-3892 1755-053X |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_journals_208180608 |
| source | Periodicals Index Online; EBSCOhost Business Source Complete; JSTOR Archive Collection A-Z Listing; Alma/SFX Local Collection |
| subjects | Asset income Bank loans Banks Business management Coefficients Compensation Compensation management Corporate Compensation Policy Special Issue Corporate reorganization Financial institutions Financial management Home loans Impacts Management Manager behavior Mathematical models Metropolitan statistical areas Organizational structure Ownership Profitability Profits Regulation Savings & loan associations Savings and loan associations Studies Variable coefficients Wages |
| title | Management Ownership and Firm Compensation Policy: Evidence from Converting Savings and Loan Associations |
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