Is Tax Reform in the Public Interest? a Rent-Seeking Perspective
This article argues that rent-seeking competition over tax reform can exhaust prospective efficiency gains, thus making tax reform a potential negative-sum activity—especially when considered over the entire rent-seeking cycle. It concludes that a positive defense against negative-sum tax reform gam...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Public finance quarterly 1994-01, Vol.22 (1), p.3-21 |
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| container_title | Public finance quarterly |
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| creator | de Vanssay, Xavier Spindler, Zane A. |
| description | This article argues that rent-seeking competition over tax reform can exhaust
prospective efficiency gains, thus making tax reform a potential negative-sum
activity—especially when considered over the entire rent-seeking cycle. It concludes
that a positive defense against negative-sum tax reform games can arise from public
choice economists debunking the game's ideological basis and constructing "rent-seeking impact statements" for proposed tax reforms. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1177/109114219402200101 |
| format | Article |
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that a positive defense against negative-sum tax reform games can arise from public
choice economists debunking the game's ideological basis and constructing "rent-seeking impact statements" for proposed tax reforms.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0048-5853</identifier><identifier>ISSN: 1091-1421</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1552-7530</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1177/109114219402200101</identifier><identifier>CODEN: PFQADD</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE Publications</publisher><subject>Analysis ; Finance ; Fiscal policy ; Government spending ; Public finance ; Social costs ; Tax reform ; Tax revenue estimating ; Taxation ; Taxpayer compliance</subject><ispartof>Public finance quarterly, 1994-01, Vol.22 (1), p.3-21</ispartof><rights>COPYRIGHT 1994 Sage Publications, Inc.</rights><rights>Copyright SAGE PUBLICATIONS, INC. Jan 1994</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c451t-3f9423e060a280da004f8e426cd67e3e38960cfc87f1bf798af21b5ea3d353d03</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c451t-3f9423e060a280da004f8e426cd67e3e38960cfc87f1bf798af21b5ea3d353d03</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/109114219402200101$$EPDF$$P50$$Gsage$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://journals.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/109114219402200101$$EHTML$$P50$$Gsage$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,780,784,21818,27865,27923,27924,43620,43621</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>de Vanssay, Xavier</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Spindler, Zane A.</creatorcontrib><title>Is Tax Reform in the Public Interest? a Rent-Seeking Perspective</title><title>Public finance quarterly</title><description>This article argues that rent-seeking competition over tax reform can exhaust
prospective efficiency gains, thus making tax reform a potential negative-sum
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choice economists debunking the game's ideological basis and constructing "rent-seeking impact statements" for proposed tax reforms.</description><subject>Analysis</subject><subject>Finance</subject><subject>Fiscal policy</subject><subject>Government spending</subject><subject>Public finance</subject><subject>Social costs</subject><subject>Tax reform</subject><subject>Tax revenue estimating</subject><subject>Taxation</subject><subject>Taxpayer compliance</subject><issn>0048-5853</issn><issn>1091-1421</issn><issn>1552-7530</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>1994</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>7TQ</sourceid><recordid>eNp9kVtLw0AQhRdRsFb_gE_BZ2Nn9pLLkxbxUihYtD6H7WY2prZJ3U1F_70rEXywOPMwMHxn5sBh7BThAjFNRwg5ouSYS-AcAAH32ACV4nGqBOyzAYDMYpUpcciOvF9CqFzwAbua-GiuP6JHsq1bR3UTdS8UzbaLVW2iSdORI99dRjoATRc_Eb3WTRXNyPkNma5-p2N2YPXK08nPHLLn25v59X08fbibXI-nsZEKu1jYXHJBkIDmGZQ6-LEZSZ6YMklJkMjyBIw1WWpxYdM805bjQpEWpVCiBDFkZ_3djWvftsFUsWy3rgkvCw5pghkXGKDzHqr0ioq6sW3ntKmoIadXbUO2DusxyhylzFXA4x146JLWtdnF8543rvXekS02rl5r91kgFN85FH9zCKJRL_K6ol_T_yi-AGKIhNI</recordid><startdate>199401</startdate><enddate>199401</enddate><creator>de Vanssay, Xavier</creator><creator>Spindler, Zane A.</creator><general>SAGE Publications</general><general>Sage Publications, Inc</general><general>SAGE PUBLICATIONS, INC</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7TQ</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>DHY</scope><scope>DON</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>199401</creationdate><title>Is Tax Reform in the Public Interest? a Rent-Seeking Perspective</title><author>de Vanssay, Xavier ; Spindler, Zane A.</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c451t-3f9423e060a280da004f8e426cd67e3e38960cfc87f1bf798af21b5ea3d353d03</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>1994</creationdate><topic>Analysis</topic><topic>Finance</topic><topic>Fiscal policy</topic><topic>Government spending</topic><topic>Public finance</topic><topic>Social costs</topic><topic>Tax reform</topic><topic>Tax revenue estimating</topic><topic>Taxation</topic><topic>Taxpayer compliance</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>de Vanssay, Xavier</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Spindler, Zane A.</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>PAIS Index</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>PAIS International</collection><collection>PAIS International (Ovid)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>Public finance quarterly</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>de Vanssay, Xavier</au><au>Spindler, Zane A.</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Is Tax Reform in the Public Interest? a Rent-Seeking Perspective</atitle><jtitle>Public finance quarterly</jtitle><date>1994-01</date><risdate>1994</risdate><volume>22</volume><issue>1</issue><spage>3</spage><epage>21</epage><pages>3-21</pages><issn>0048-5853</issn><issn>1091-1421</issn><eissn>1552-7530</eissn><coden>PFQADD</coden><abstract>This article argues that rent-seeking competition over tax reform can exhaust
prospective efficiency gains, thus making tax reform a potential negative-sum
activity—especially when considered over the entire rent-seeking cycle. It concludes
that a positive defense against negative-sum tax reform games can arise from public
choice economists debunking the game's ideological basis and constructing "rent-seeking impact statements" for proposed tax reforms.</abstract><cop>Thousand Oaks, CA</cop><pub>SAGE Publications</pub><doi>10.1177/109114219402200101</doi><tpages>19</tpages></addata></record> |
| fulltext | fulltext |
| identifier | ISSN: 0048-5853 |
| ispartof | Public finance quarterly, 1994-01, Vol.22 (1), p.3-21 |
| issn | 0048-5853 1091-1421 1552-7530 |
| language | eng |
| recordid | cdi_proquest_journals_207618231 |
| source | PAIS Index; SAGE Complete A-Z List; Alma/SFX Local Collection |
| subjects | Analysis Finance Fiscal policy Government spending Public finance Social costs Tax reform Tax revenue estimating Taxation Taxpayer compliance |
| title | Is Tax Reform in the Public Interest? a Rent-Seeking Perspective |
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