What's the damage? Environmental regulation with policy‐motivated bureaucrats

In choosing environmental policy, governments rely on information provided by bureaucrats, who may have a political motivation of their own. We analyze the ensuing principal–agent relationship and derive the government's optimal contract. We find that a regulatory agent who is more environmenta...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Journal of public economic theory 2018-08, Vol.20 (4), p.613-633
Hauptverfasser:	Voss, Achim, Lingens, Jörg
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Bureaucrats Economic models Economic theory Environmental impact Environmental regulations Government
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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