POLITICAL INEQUALITY, CENTRALIZED SANCTIONING INSTITUTIONS, AND THE MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC GOODS
ABSTRACT Centralized sanctioning institutions cultivate cooperation by eradicating the gains from free‐riding. Studies show that electing a community member to operate a centralized sanctioning institution further increases support for the public good. These studies have overlooked an all‐too‐common...
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| Veröffentlicht in: | Bulletin of economic research 2018-07, Vol.70 (3), p.251-268 |
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| container_title | Bulletin of economic research |
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| creator | Chang, Han Il Dawes, Christopher T. Johnson, Tim |
| description | ABSTRACT
Centralized sanctioning institutions cultivate cooperation by eradicating the gains from free‐riding. Studies show that electing a community member to operate a centralized sanctioning institution further increases support for the public good. These studies have overlooked an all‐too‐common attribute of non‐laboratory elections: political inequality. In this paper, we replicate those studies and, then, introduce novel experimental treatments that examine how political inequality influences the cooperation‐enhancing effect of a democratic election to centralized sanctioning institutions. In our novel treatment conditions, participants receive either a random allotment of votes that they can use to elect a centralized sanctioning authority or an allocation of votes proportional to their earnings in a previously‐executed public goods game. We find that political inequalities created via the random allocation of votes do not hinder cooperation, whereas political inequalities created via past game play undermine elected authorities and diminish contributions to the public good from individuals advantaged by political inequality. |
| doi_str_mv | 10.1111/boer.12140 |
| format | Article |
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Centralized sanctioning institutions cultivate cooperation by eradicating the gains from free‐riding. Studies show that electing a community member to operate a centralized sanctioning institution further increases support for the public good. These studies have overlooked an all‐too‐common attribute of non‐laboratory elections: political inequality. In this paper, we replicate those studies and, then, introduce novel experimental treatments that examine how political inequality influences the cooperation‐enhancing effect of a democratic election to centralized sanctioning institutions. In our novel treatment conditions, participants receive either a random allotment of votes that they can use to elect a centralized sanctioning authority or an allocation of votes proportional to their earnings in a previously‐executed public goods game. We find that political inequalities created via the random allocation of votes do not hinder cooperation, whereas political inequalities created via past game play undermine elected authorities and diminish contributions to the public good from individuals advantaged by political inequality.</description><identifier>ISSN: 0307-3378</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1467-8586</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1111/boer.12140</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Oxford: Blackwell Publishing Ltd</publisher><subject>Centralization ; Cooperation ; Earnings ; H41 ; Inequality ; lab experiment ; political inequality ; Public good ; Public goods ; public goods game ; Sanctions</subject><ispartof>Bulletin of economic research, 2018-07, Vol.70 (3), p.251-268</ispartof><rights>2017 Board of Trustees of the Bulletin of Economic Research and John Wiley & Sons Ltd</rights><rights>Copyright © 2018 Board of Trustees of the Bulletin of Economic Research and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><citedby>FETCH-LOGICAL-c3340-263115e4986dc18c0a8ffe5fbf88f53f59b5436d2329d9ead802f5fb3b4f05263</citedby><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c3340-263115e4986dc18c0a8ffe5fbf88f53f59b5436d2329d9ead802f5fb3b4f05263</cites></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><linktopdf>$$Uhttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111%2Fboer.12140$$EPDF$$P50$$Gwiley$$H</linktopdf><linktohtml>$$Uhttps://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111%2Fboer.12140$$EHTML$$P50$$Gwiley$$H</linktohtml><link.rule.ids>314,777,781,1412,27905,27906,45555,45556</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Chang, Han Il</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Dawes, Christopher T.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Johnson, Tim</creatorcontrib><title>POLITICAL INEQUALITY, CENTRALIZED SANCTIONING INSTITUTIONS, AND THE MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC GOODS</title><title>Bulletin of economic research</title><description>ABSTRACT
Centralized sanctioning institutions cultivate cooperation by eradicating the gains from free‐riding. Studies show that electing a community member to operate a centralized sanctioning institution further increases support for the public good. These studies have overlooked an all‐too‐common attribute of non‐laboratory elections: political inequality. In this paper, we replicate those studies and, then, introduce novel experimental treatments that examine how political inequality influences the cooperation‐enhancing effect of a democratic election to centralized sanctioning institutions. In our novel treatment conditions, participants receive either a random allotment of votes that they can use to elect a centralized sanctioning authority or an allocation of votes proportional to their earnings in a previously‐executed public goods game. We find that political inequalities created via the random allocation of votes do not hinder cooperation, whereas political inequalities created via past game play undermine elected authorities and diminish contributions to the public good from individuals advantaged by political inequality.</description><subject>Centralization</subject><subject>Cooperation</subject><subject>Earnings</subject><subject>H41</subject><subject>Inequality</subject><subject>lab experiment</subject><subject>political inequality</subject><subject>Public good</subject><subject>Public goods</subject><subject>public goods game</subject><subject>Sanctions</subject><issn>0307-3378</issn><issn>1467-8586</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2018</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><recordid>eNp9kM1OwzAQhC0EEqVw4QkscUNNsePEcY5pmraWilMa5wAXKz-21KqQklChvj0O4cxedkf77Y40ANxjNMW2nspGt1PsYg9dgBH2aOAwn9FLMEIEBQ4hAbsGN123RwhRHHgjoDbpmkseR2vIRfKSR1a9TmCcCLm181syh1kkYslTwcXSMpnkMu9lNoGRmEO5SuBzxIVMhOUSmC7gJp-teQyXaTrPbsGVKQ6dvvvrY5AvEhmvnHW67F2dihAPOS4lGPvaCxmtK8wqVDBjtG9Kw5jxifHD0vcIrV3ihnWoi5oh19g1KT2DfHs9Bg_D32PbfJ5096X2zan9sJbKRTTArksDZqnHgaraputabdSx3b0X7VlhpPoAVR-g-g3QwniAv3cHff6HVLM02Q43P32sae8</recordid><startdate>201807</startdate><enddate>201807</enddate><creator>Chang, Han Il</creator><creator>Dawes, Christopher T.</creator><creator>Johnson, Tim</creator><general>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>8BJ</scope><scope>FQK</scope><scope>JBE</scope></search><sort><creationdate>201807</creationdate><title>POLITICAL INEQUALITY, CENTRALIZED SANCTIONING INSTITUTIONS, AND THE MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC GOODS</title><author>Chang, Han Il ; Dawes, Christopher T. ; Johnson, Tim</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c3340-263115e4986dc18c0a8ffe5fbf88f53f59b5436d2329d9ead802f5fb3b4f05263</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2018</creationdate><topic>Centralization</topic><topic>Cooperation</topic><topic>Earnings</topic><topic>H41</topic><topic>Inequality</topic><topic>lab experiment</topic><topic>political inequality</topic><topic>Public good</topic><topic>Public goods</topic><topic>public goods game</topic><topic>Sanctions</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Chang, Han Il</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Dawes, Christopher T.</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Johnson, Tim</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences (IBSS)</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><collection>International Bibliography of the Social Sciences</collection><jtitle>Bulletin of economic research</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Chang, Han Il</au><au>Dawes, Christopher T.</au><au>Johnson, Tim</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>POLITICAL INEQUALITY, CENTRALIZED SANCTIONING INSTITUTIONS, AND THE MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC GOODS</atitle><jtitle>Bulletin of economic research</jtitle><date>2018-07</date><risdate>2018</risdate><volume>70</volume><issue>3</issue><spage>251</spage><epage>268</epage><pages>251-268</pages><issn>0307-3378</issn><eissn>1467-8586</eissn><abstract>ABSTRACT
Centralized sanctioning institutions cultivate cooperation by eradicating the gains from free‐riding. Studies show that electing a community member to operate a centralized sanctioning institution further increases support for the public good. These studies have overlooked an all‐too‐common attribute of non‐laboratory elections: political inequality. In this paper, we replicate those studies and, then, introduce novel experimental treatments that examine how political inequality influences the cooperation‐enhancing effect of a democratic election to centralized sanctioning institutions. In our novel treatment conditions, participants receive either a random allotment of votes that they can use to elect a centralized sanctioning authority or an allocation of votes proportional to their earnings in a previously‐executed public goods game. We find that political inequalities created via the random allocation of votes do not hinder cooperation, whereas political inequalities created via past game play undermine elected authorities and diminish contributions to the public good from individuals advantaged by political inequality.</abstract><cop>Oxford</cop><pub>Blackwell Publishing Ltd</pub><doi>10.1111/boer.12140</doi><tpages>18</tpages></addata></record> |
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| language | eng |
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| source | Wiley Online Library Journals Frontfile Complete; Business Source Complete |
| subjects | Centralization Cooperation Earnings H41 Inequality lab experiment political inequality Public good Public goods public goods game Sanctions |
| title | POLITICAL INEQUALITY, CENTRALIZED SANCTIONING INSTITUTIONS, AND THE MAINTENANCE OF PUBLIC GOODS |
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