The myth of congressional supervision of monetary policy

The 1975 House Concurrent Resolution 133 required the Federal Reserve to appear regularly before the Senate and House Banking Committees to present its objectives on the ranges of growth or diminution of monetary and credit aggregates. Despite this mandate, there has been no revolution in Congressio...

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Veröffentlicht in:	Journal of monetary economics 1978-04, Vol.4 (2), p.363-370
1. Verfasser:	Pierce, James L.
Format:	Artikel
Sprache:	eng
Schlagworte:	Authority Congressional investigations Federal Reserve monetary policy Growth Legislation Monetary policy Money supply Policy making Stabilization
Online-Zugang:	Volltext
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