Natur und Freiheit: Hamanns »Metakritik« in naturrechtlicher Hinsicht

SUMMARY Starting from the assumption that the occurrence of "imposition" ("Einsetzung") in Hamann's Metakritik über den Purismum der Vernunft is motivated not only by a theological line of thought tending to develop the sacramental nature of language, but also by the tradition of natural law theory, the article places emphasis on the fundamental concept of commitment for Hamann's argumentation concerning signs and communication. Evidence for this assumption is provided by the critical interest Hamann manifests for natural law theory, as well as by the fact that "imposition" figures as the central concept in Weigel's and Pufendorf's explication of the origin of cultural values and language. In his view, speech and action are of identical nature, insofar as they both are rooted in the will and emerge, therefore, from the original gift of freedom. [...]imposition" comes to denote the absolute simultaneity of several elements of communicative action: the uttering and the creation of a sign are strictly inseparable from the expression of meaning or intention. PUFENDORF, De jure naturae et gentium I, I, 4 (s. o. Anm. 42), 3: »Porro uti modus originarius producendi entia physica est creatio; ita modum, quo entia moralia producuntur, vixmelius possis exprimere, quam per vocabulum impositionis« (Ferner, ebenso wie die ursprüngliche Art und Weise, körperliche Dinge hervorzubringen, die Schöpfung ist, so kann die Art und Weise, dunch weiche moralische Dinge produziert werden, kauin besser ausgedrückt werden als durch das Wort impositio).